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INTRODUCTION

The discovery and widespread use of antibiotics stand as perhaps the
most important medical advance of the twentieth century. These 'miracle'
drugs, starting with penicillin, made many previously fatal bacterial infections curable with a few pills or injections. It was unsurprising that over the
latter half of the century we continuously intensified our use of these potent,
cost-effective substances.

The Author thanks John Duffy, Rich Hynes, Fred McChesney, Alan Meese, Warren Schwartz, and
workshop participants at Georgetown and William & Mary law schools. This research was funded in
part by a grant from the Barber Fund for Interdisciplinary Legal Research.
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An inevitable (with the benefit of hindsight) result of unleashing this
powerful attack on our bacterial foes did come as a surprise: bacteria
evolved defenses to antibiotics, often with astonishing speed. Doctors continue to detect these resistant strains of bacteria (resistant to one or more antibiotics) in greater and greater numbers. In 2000, the World Health
Organization warned that "the world could be plunged back into the 'preantibiotic era' when people commonly died from diseases that in modem
times have been easily treated with antibiotics .... " 1 In Britain, the government estimates that over 5000 hospital patients a year die from bacterial
infections resistant to antibiotics. 2
The trend may have intensified recently. In the fall of 2003, four
members of the University of Southern California's national championship
football team were hospitalized for bacterial infections resistant to commonly used antibiotics. 3 Researchers at Children's Hospital in Pittsburgh
reported an outbreak of resistant streptococcus ("strep") bacteria. The lead
author of the study stated that "[w]e've talked about this for years and now
it's here." 4 Over a thousand prison inmates in Los Angeles County contracted "painful and aggressive skin infections caused by a bacterium resistant to many antibiotics . . . . " 5 Doctors found this outbreak particularly
worrisome because the bacteria spread to patients without skin wounds or
other weaknesses ordinarily necessary to make people susceptible to infection. Although there were no fatalities, "in some cases doctors ... had to
cut away diseased tissue and administer weeks of intravenous antibiotics." 6
Initial reports in March 2003 indicated that the germ has spread outside the
prison population and across the nation to Boston. 7 A recent study found
that ciprofloxacin ("cipro"), the antibiotic popularized as the agent of
choice against anthrax infections, has become increasingly ineffective
against many germs over the last few years. 8 In short, we now face the sobering possibility of serious, even lethal, bacterial infections that are ontreatable.
Despite increasing news coverage, the threat posed by resistant bacteria does not seem to have made it onto the body politic's radar screen.
There is little if any concerted public pressure on leaders to take decisive
measures .to manage more judiciously our precious stocks of antibiotics.
1

Marc Kaufman, Microbes Winning War, WASH. POST, June 13,2000, at AI.
Linda Brown, Hospital Infections:
Case Studies, BBC NEWS, Feb. I 7, 2000, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/646369.stm.
3
Charles Ornstein & Gary Klein, Outbreak of Staph Hits USC Team, L.A. TIMES, Sept. I 3, 2003, at
Bl.
4
Laurie Tarkan, Outbreak ofDrug-Resistant Strep Bacteria, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at A23 .
5
David Tuller, Mystery Surrounds a Virulent Skin Infection, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at 06.
6 /d.
2

7

Stephen Smith, Resistant-Bacteria Reports Cause Alarm, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2003, at B I.
Melinda M. Neuhauser et al., Antibiotic Resistance Among Gram-Negative Bacilli in US Intensive
Care Units, Implications for Fluoroquinolone Use, 289 JAMA 885 (2003).
8
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Inaction is all the more unfortunate because overuse of antibiotics is a classic collective action problem-precisely the sort of problem where government action and only government action can provide a solution. The
purpose of this Article is to outline efficient, effective measures to economize on antibiotic use, so that we have effective drugs for serious cases
long into the future, and to combat any future bacterial plague that may occur.
Part II gives a brief history of antibiotics and the bacterial evolution of
resistance to them. Part III explains aspects of the biology of resistance
relevant to policy choices. Two lessons stand out from these sections.
First, bacteria acquire resistance much more easily than one might think:
they routinely share genes encoding resistance with a wide variety of other
bacteria, including very dissimilar species. Second, recent research suggests that once bacteria develop resistance to an antibiotic, they are unlikely
to lose resistance even if the particular antibiotic disappears from their environment. Thus, there appears to be little hope of 'reviving' the effectiveness of antibiotics by withdrawing them from use for some 'rest' period.
This last point serves as a launching point for Part IV, which draws on
economics to formulate optimal policies for limiting antibiotic use. As a resource unable to regenerate itself, antibiotics are analogous to minerals in
the ground, as opposed to fish in the sea: they are an exhaustible (or depletable) resource. Although we can continue to manufacture them indefinitely, the number of effective doses of each antibiotic is limited by the
ability of bacteria to develop resistance. As such, they require special economic analysis. Within the framework of exhaustible resource economics,
there is a fundamental difficulty with antibiotics: current /ow-value uses
(e.g., treatment of minor infections that may not even be bacterial) will deprive us of future high-value uses (e.g., treatment of life-threatening bacterial infections). This happens because there is no way for future potential
users to pay present low-value users to forego consumption. As such, antibiotic consumption has a negative external effect on future consumption.
The fundamental motivation driving the policy discussion in this Article is
to identify measures that will discourage current low-value use, to preserve
effective doses of the antibiotic for future high-value uses.
Previous work has either focused on this negative externality without
drawing on exhaustible resource economics, or has used such economics
but assumed that all infections are equally harmful, making it impossible to
analyze what this Article takes as the fundamental question-trading off
current low-value uses for future high-value uses. In addition, this Article
studies at length the policy implications of' measures not previously examined. Part IV.C.3 shows that there is a strong case for the government to
subsidize tests that can identify both the germ responsible for an infection
and the drugs to which the germ has resistance.
Part IV.D then introduces patents (in economic terms, time-limited
monopolies) into the analysis and studies their effect on antibiotic policy,
613
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stressing that patents serve a property-right creation function in this context, independent of their usual innovation-inducing role. This section
makes a novel and radical argument that patent terms for antibiotics should
be extremely long. Trying to encourage pharmaceutical companies to
stockpile drugs to deal with potential plagues, the subject of Part IV.E, buttresses the case for very long-term patents.
Finally, Part V addresses jurisdictional questions raised by state borders in America (Part V.A) and distributional issues raised by the necessity
of worldwide efforts to curb overuse of antibiotics. Given the extent of international travel and trade, overuse of antibiotics in any nation likely will
spread resistant bacteria around the globe. Any policy, then, is only as
good as its "weakest link." Under such conditions, it is in the self interest
of wealthy nations to subsidize the efforts of poorer nations.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTIBIOTICS AND BACTERIAL RESISTANCE

Predating our scientific age, some cultures seem to have stumbled
across effective naturally occurring antibacterial agents. At least one study
indicates that members of an ancient culture ingested therapeutic doses of
tetracycline, an antibiotic 'rediscovered' in the twentieth century. 9 Other
folk remedies, such as ingesting moldy bread, may have delivered effective
doses of antibiotics. 10
Although there were a number of earlier scientific observations and
findings, the antibiotic age began in earnest when Alexander Fleming noticed that a mold contaminating one of his bacteria cultures had killed off
all the germs in its neighborhood. 11 Later research revealed that the mold
produced a chemical, penicillin, that could cure bacterial infections in humans.12 Since this discovery, scientists have identified, and pharmaceutical
companies have produced, numerous different antibacterial compounds that
are effective against human (and animal) infections. 13
These antibiotics have had a dramatic positive impact on human health.
Formerly untreatable bacterial infections, some lethal or seriously disabling,
have ceased to pose any threat. In conjunction with improved public health
(e.g., water supplies free of cholera and other microbes), antibiotics in-

9

Everett J. Basset et at., Tetracycline-Labeled Bone from Ancient Sudanese Nubia, 209 SCIENCE
1532 (1980).
10

MADELINE DREXLER, SECRET AGENTS : THE MENACE OF EMERGING INFECTIONS 121 (2002),

available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309076382/html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
11 David Ho, Scientists & Thinkers: Alexander Fleming, TIME, Mar. 29, 1999, available at
http ://www .time.com/time/time I 00/scientist/profile/fleming.html.

12
13

!d.
MICHAEL T . MADIGAN ET Al., BROCK BIOLOGY OF MICROORGANISMS 426, 440, 442 (8th ed.

1997).
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creased the median life span by eight years, from sixty-two to seventy, during their first twenty years ofuse (1935 to 1955). 14
Yet almost from the beginning of their widespread use, doctors noticed
that bacteria developed countermeasures to antibiotics. Researchers reported significant levels of penicillin resistance in "staph." infections (short
for Staphylococcus aureus, a common species of bacteria that normally
does not cause serious infections, but can if it enters the bloodstream or vital organs) as early as 1945. 15 Over ninety-five percent of staph. bacteria
today are resistant to penicillin and related compounds. 16
Multiple resistant Staphylococcus aureus ("MRSA") strains have successively evolved resistance to almost every class of antibiotics, including:
synthetic variants of penicillin such as methicillin, cephalosporins, penems,
and carbapenems. There was great hope in the 1980s that tluoroquinolones,
such as cipro, would remain effective because they use a novel mechanism
of manufactured origin to attack bacteria. This unnatural, or "synthetic"
characteristic, however, made little difference. "A study by the Centers for
Disease Control showed that ciprotloxacin resistance of MRSA went from
less than 5% to greater than 80% within one year .... " 17
Today, some strains of MRSA are resistant to all mainstream antibiotics except vancomycin, which has become a critical antibiotic of "last resort."18 Even more ominously, there have been sporadic appearances of
staph. infections exhibiting moderate resistance to vancomycin (labeled
VISA-vancomycin intermediate Staphylococcus aureus). 19 Summing up
staph.'s repeated ability to defeat almost all antibiotics deployed against it,
one scientist said that these episodes "illustrate the rapid ability of bacteria
to become resistant to virtually all antibacterial agents whether of natural
origin . . . partially synthetic . . . or totally synthetic, such as tluoroquinolones."20

14

David Schlessinger, Biological Basis for Antibacterial Action, in MECHANISMS OF MICROBIAL
DISEASE 78 (Moselio Schaechter et al. eds ., 1993).
15 Wesley Spink & Viola Ferris, Quantitative Action of Penicillin Inhibitor from PenicillinResistant Strains ofStaphylococci, I 02 SCIENCE 221 (1945).
16 Harold C. Neu, The Crisis in Antibiotic Resistance, 257 SCIENCE 1064 (1992) (citing Bruce Lyon
& Ronald A . Skurray, Antimicrobial Resistance of Staphylococcus aureus: Genetic Basics, 51
MICROBIOLOGY REV. 88 (1987)).
17 /d. (citing Henry A. Blumberg et a!., Rapid Development of Ciprojloxacin Resistance in Methicillin-Susceptible and -Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, 163 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1279 (1991 )).
18 OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-H-629, IMPACT OF ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT
BACTERIA 72 (U .S. Gov't Printing Off. 1995), available at http://www.wws .princeton.edu/
-ota!diskl/1995/9503_n.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) [hereinafter OTA).
19
Ctrs. for Disease Control, VISAIVRSA Vancomycin-Intermediate/Resistant Staphylococcus aureus
Fact Sheet (Apr. I, 2003) (documenting cases of VISA in eight states), at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidodlhip/aresist/visa.htm.
20 Neu, supra note 16, at I 065.
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Some strains of another family of bacteria, enterococci, have developed complete resistance to vancomycin along with all other mainstream
antibiotics. 21 The mechanism developed by the bacteria
completely changes the ingredients it uses to make its cell wall, ingredients
that are normally targeted by vancomycin . . . . "That's a real tour de force,"
says David Hooper, an infection control director at Massachusetts General
Hospital. "What they tell me is: No matter what we come up with, over time
bugs are going to figure out a way to get around it.'m

Fortunately, enteroccoci cause many fewer serious infections than
staph. As discussed in the next section, however, unrelated bacteria frequently share genes encoding resistance to antibiotics. MRSA acquiring
complete resistance to vancomycin would constitute "an unstoppable killer ... the latest twist in an international public health nightmare: increasing bacterial resistance to many antibiotics ... :m
There is nothing particularly special about staph. or enterococcus; virtually all infectious bacteria have developed resistance to some antibiotics.
Strep. bacteria responsible for many throat infections developed significant
resistance to the antibiotic erythromycin in only two years. 24 Moraxella, a
source of middle ear and chest infections, was virtually I 00% vulnerable to
ampicillin in the 1970s; within twenty years, over 75% of such infections
were fully resistant to it, and to chemically similar antibiotics. 25
The threat posed by antibiotic-resistant bacteria is greater because of a
sort of whipsaw effect in the pharmaceutical industry. By the early 1980s,
there were over I 00 antibiotics and resistance was not yet a serious problem. Thus, drug makers invested relatively little effort in developing new
antibacterial agents. When MRSA and other resistant strains began to pose
a serious public health problem in the 1990s, there were no new drugs to
deploy. Perhaps worse, given the long period required to develop new
drugs, there were few drugs in the pipeline. Although pharmaceutical companies seem to be gearing up their antibiotic R&D efforts, society will not
reap the benefits from these efforts for years. 26 Over the short term, before
researchers develop new antibiotics, untreatable bacterial infections are a
real possibility.
The speed with which bacteria build up resistance suggests a need for a
steady stream of new treatments. Recall that MRSA became largely resistant to cipro after only three years. Early experience with linezolid, a novel

21

OTA,supranote 18,at72.
!d. at 146.
23
Stuart B. Levy, The Challenge ofAntibiotic Resistance, 278 Sci. AM. 46, 46 (1998).
24
Neu, supra note 16.
25
Richard J. Wallace Jr. et al., BRO ft-Lactamases of Branhamella catarrhalis and Moraxel/a Subgenus Moraxe/!a, 33 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 1845 (1989).
26
OTA, supra note 18, at 28.
22
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type of antibiotic approved in 2000, is no more promising: doctors detected
strains of staph. resistant to this new drug in 200 I. 27
The threat posed by antibiotic-resistant bacteria has caught the attention of the medical establishment. The Centers for Disease Control
launched a "Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance Campaign" in 200 128 ; the
World Health Organization has a similar program. 29 Before discussing the
efficacy of these and other policies designed to deal with the threat of resistant microbes, 30 the next section lays out some basic biological facts about
bacteria and resistance that are important in assessing policy responses.
III. THE BIOLOGY OF ANTIBIOTICS AND RESISTANCE

There seems little doubt that heavy use of antibiotics has driven the
rapid spread of resistant strains. Bacterial foes such as molds and fungi
have fought such biochemical wars with bacteria for ages, but apparently
never with the intensity that humans have employed antibiotics over the last
sixty-odd years. Tests on bacteria preserved from before the age of antibiotics show that bacteria had evolved some resistance to naturally occurring
antibiotics, but most remained vulnerable to the vast majority of the antibiotics developed since Fleming's discovery of penicillin. 31
Heavy use does not necessarily mean overuse; e.g., if every dose of
every antibiotic administered saved a life, it would be difficult to argue that
we are wasting this valuable resource. Use, however, has not been so limited. Doctors routinely prescribe antibacterial drugs to treat infections that
are likely viral-in which case (i) the treatment has absolutely no therapeutic benefit for the patient, and (ii) the use of the antibiotic still fosters the
spread of resistance in other bacteria present in the patient. Some estimate
that half of all antibiotic prescriptions are written for patients who will experience no benefit from the medication. 32
In fairness to doctors and patients, it is often expensive and timeconsuming to determine if an infection is viral or bacterial. 33 If, however,
the infection is not serious, then there is a good argument that antibiotics
simply should not be used. If the infection is viral, the drugs are worthless

27

DREXLER, supra note I 0, at 120.
Ctrs. for Disease Control, Campaign to Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance in Healthcare Settings,
at http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/healthcare/default.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
29
World Health Org., Communicable Disease Surveillance & Response, at http://www.who.int/
csr/drugresist/en (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
30
See infra Part IV.
31
Victoria M. Hughes & Naomi Datta, Conjugative Plasmids in Bacteria of the 'Pre-Antibiotic·
Era, 302 NATURE 725 (1983).
32
OTA, supra note 18, at 73-74.
33
/d. at 127-29, 134; see infra Part IV.C.3.
28
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to the patient; even if the infection is bacterial, frequently antibiotics do not
even shorten the duration of the illness. 34
Although these may be the largest categories of overuse, there are
other significant prodigal misuses of antibiotics. Many surgeons use them
far earlier than necessary as prophylactic measures to prevent infection after
surgery. 35 In a slightly different vein, doctors often prescribe "widespectrum" antibiotics-those that are active against many types of bacteria-when a narrower-spectrum drug would suffice. This, of course, accelerates the spread of resistance to those antibiotics that are useful in the
greatest variety of cases, in effect wasting the effectiveness of a more valuable drug.
The livestock industry may be frittering away the usefulness of antibiotics by using large quantities of the drugs, at low doses, as growth enhancers; up to seventy percent of the antibiotics used in the United States each
year may be for this purpose. 36 This steady exposure to low doses creates
an ideal environment for the evolution of resistant bacteria. The low doses
mean that strains with only an initial, modest resistance can survive exposure to the drug, and continual exposure places pressure on all bacteria present to evolve greater resistance.
Although there is no positive proof that resistant strains that evolved in
animals have jumped the species barrier to humans, scientists have recently
come very close to demonstrating such a link. 37 Moreover, there appears to
be a widespread belief that such a path of transmission exists. Based on the
fear of this link, Sweden has banned the large-scale use of antibiotics for
animal growth enhancement. Denmark banned the use of avoparcin, a close
relative of the important "last resort" antibiotic vancomycin, after studies
showed its use increased the presence of vancomycin-resistant enterococci
(VRE) in Europe. Similar legislation has been introduced to the U.S. Congress,38 and the World Health Organization now urges a complete halt to the
systematic use of antibiotics in animal feed. 39
Long-term use of antibiotics in all of these inappropriate ways placed
extraordinary pressure on bacteria to change (or die). The first, necessary
step in the appearance of resistance to a new antibiotic is simple random
34

Jerome 0 . Klein, Otitis externa, Otitis media, Mastoiditis, in GERALD L. MANDELL ET AL. ,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 579, 579-85 (4th ed . 1994).
35 Richard P. Wenzel, Preoperative Antibiotic Prophylaxis, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 337 (1992).
36 DREXLER, supra note 10, at 139.
37
C. Moubareck et al., Multiple Antibiotic Resistance Gene Transfer from Animal to Human Enterococci in the Digestive Tract of Gnotobiotic Mice, 47 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY

2993 (2003).

38

Preservation of Antibiotics for Human Treatment Act of 2002, H.R. 3804, 107th Cong. (2002)
(prohibiting the non-therapeutic use in animal feed of eight antimicrobial drugs that could affect resistance to drugs used in human medicine), available at http://www.asm.org/Policylindex.asp?bid=3987.
39 David Ferber, Antibiotic Resistance: WHO Advises Kicking the Livestock Antibiotic Habit, 301
SCIENCE 1027 (2003).
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mutation. Just as humans evolved from apes based on a series of small,
random "errors" in DNA replication that gave individuals more strength or
cunning, any bacteria that mutates in a way that reduces the effectiveness of
an antibiotic will have a competitive advantage in the presence of such (to
the bacteria) poison. Bacteria, however, evolve much more rapidly. Humans have roughly five generations a century; bacteria can have over
25,000 generations a year. 40 Every instance of reproduction offers another
opportunity for mutation. Moreover, bacterial genetic material is less stable
than that of more complex organisms, further increasing the number of mutations. The vast majority of these random alterations to its genetic material
undoubtedly harm the bacteria, but a small percentage are useful-such as
mutations that provide a defense against antibiotics.
Unfortunately, mutations are not the end of the processes by which
bacteria develop resistance to antibiotics. Bacteria are surprisingly sexual:
they continually swap bits of genetic material ("plasmids"), and sometimes
these strands of DNA contain codes for resistance.
The bacterium itself is the focus, if the resistance trait is linked solely to that
bacterium and cannot be shared by others. This is, however, not the case with
most resistant traits in the majority of bacteria. They have evolved extrachromosomal replicating genes called plasmids and their associated transposons
which allow rapid and very broad dissemination of genes .... Gene transfer
crosses species and genus barriers. The genetic flexibility and versatility of
bacteria have therefore contributed largely to the efficiency by which antibiotic
resistance has spread among bacteria and among environments globally. 41

Note well Professor Levy's statement that these strands of DNA can
"cross[] species and genus barriers." Absent such transfers, every individual species of bacteria would have to hit on a lucky mutation to gain resistance. With such transfers, it takes only one mutation in one species to
spread resistance across a broad swath of bacteria. Worse, plasmids frequently contain the code for resistance to multiple antibiotics; thus, a single
exchange can confer resistance to more than one drug. 42
The ability of bacteria to pass around genes raises a new dimension to
the problem of growing resistance to antibiotics. As discussed in Part III,
most models assume that resistance increases with doses used and only with
doses used. The idea is that resistant mutations confer an evolutionary advantage only in the presence of the antibiotic. Bacteria, however, may pass
around plasmids conferring resistance in the absence of an antibiotic. Thus,
bacterial exchange of plasmids means that resistance can spread with the
pure passage of time, even if no additional doses are being used. As dis40

OTA, supra note 18, at 41.
Stuart B. Levy, Antibiotic Resistance: An Ecological Imbalance, in ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE :
0RJGIN, EVOLUTION, SELECTION AND SPREAD 5 (1997) (citation omitted).
42
Seth P. Cohen et al., A Multidrug Resistance Regulatory Chromosomal Locus Is Widespread
Among Enteric Bacteria, 168 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 484 ( 1993); see also OTA, supra note 18, at 43.
41
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cussed in Part IV.B.3, this possibility can significantly alter the optimal policy for employing antibiotics.
There is some evidence that the effect of doses prescribed, especially
doses recently prescribed, dominates any such time effect. A number of
studies (discussed immediately below) have shown that when a hospital or a
nation ceases use of a particular antibiotic, the percentage of bacteria resistant to that antibiotic declines. These observations raise the possibility of
restoring the potency of antibiotics by suspending their use for a sufficient
interval. In theory, with enough antibiotics, then, we could simply 'cycle'
between them. When resistance reaches some critical level, we would
"rest" that drug until bacteria lost their resistance to it. If letting antibiotics
"lie fallow" periodically did restore their potency, following such a policy
would significantly diminish, and perhaps entirely solve, the problem of resistant bacterial infections. Unfortunately, as the following argument demonstrates, withdrawing antibiotics from use is unlikely to restore their
effectiveness against resistant strains of bacteria.
The biological theory behind such a loss of resistance is that, like any
other biological function, resistance imposes a cost on bacteria. Microbes
expending energy and genetic storage space on resistance have less resources to thrive and replicate. In the presence of the antibiotic, the benefits
of resistance exceed these costs and thus resistant strains have an advantage.
Withdraw the drug and the "fitness cost" of resistance (i.e., the disadvantage
a bacteria experiences when it shifts resources to fighting antibiotics, necessarily depriving other functions of resources) has no offsetting benefit. The
hope is that non-resistant strains will then outgrow and displace their resistant cousins.
Five years ago, Stuart Levy, a leading scholar on antibiotic resistant,
expressed optimism about this possibility: "[T]he evidence suggests that,
given a 'ready and willing' susceptible flora [i.e., non-resistant strains of
bacteria], a resistance predominance can be overturned if antibiotics are removed."43 The basis for his optimism, apparently, was a series of studies
showing reduced presence of resistant bacteria on cessation of use of a
given drug. Here are some examples:
• when Czechoslovakia's hospitals cut antibiotic use from 20% to
as much as 50%, the percent of staph. infections exhibiting resistance fell significantly; 44
• when Mt. Sinai Hospital imposed strict controls on the use of
some antibiotics, mortality from infectious diseases fell; 45
43

Levy, supra note 41 , at 6.

44

Zdenek Modr, Statutory Control of Antibiotic Use in Man Versus Voluntary Restriction, in THE
CONTROL OF ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT BACTERIA 211, 214-19 (Charles H. Stuart-Harris & David M.
Harris eds., 1982).
45
Salom Z. Hirschman et a!., Use of Antimicrobial Agents in a University Teaching Hospital, 148
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• when the University of Massachusetts Hospital imposed strict
regulations on the use of vancomycin, they eliminated vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE infections) for an extended period.46
Not all such studies, however, have offered grounds for optimism:
• when doctors decreased antibiotic use by over 30% in a number of
Alaskan villages, "[n]o sustained decrease in carriage of penicillin-nonsusceptible strains was observed;"47
• when a hospital decreased antibiotic use on patients using ventilators (which can spread pneumonia easily), the percentage of the
staph. population exhibiting resistance fell only from 60% to
40%;48
• similarly, when doctors in Taiwan completely stopped prescribing
penicillin for gonorrhea, resistance did drop somewhat but leveled off at 60% of isolates. 49
Moreover, none of these studies, encouraging or discouraging, address
the key question: even if the resistant population does decline after society
shelves an antibiotic, if any resistant bacteria remain, how quickly will they
reproduce and again become omnipresent? "[T]hough resistant strains can
drop in number if they lose out in competition with drug[-]sensitive strains,
they seldom disappear completely. That means there is always a residue of
resistant bacteria around, ready to multiply if the right antibiotic rains down
on them. " 50
Over five years ago, Richard Lenski argued that the same evolutionary
forces that gave rise to resistance would also make that resistance persistent.
"[E]volving populations of bacteria tend to compensate for the deleterious
side-effects of their resistance genes .... " 51 Lenski cited a study from 1977
showing that although the first strains of gonorrhea resistant to penicillin
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 200 I, 2005 ( 1988) (noting further, however, that while the mortality rate
fell, the drop was not statistically significant and could be attributable to other factors).
46 Paul P. Belliveau et al., Limiting Vancomycin Use to Combat Vancomycin-Resistant Enterococcusfaceum, 53 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1570 (1996).
47 Thomas W. Hennessy et al., Changes in Antibiotic-Prescribing Practices and Carriage of Penicillin-Resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae: A Controlled Intervention Trial in Rural Alaska, 34
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1543 (2002).
48 Didier Gruson et al., Rotation and Restricted Use ofAntibiotics in a Medica/Intensive Care Unit:
Impact on the Incidence of Ventilator-Associated Pneumonia Caused by Antibiotic-Resistant GramNegative Bacteria, 162 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 837 (2000).
49 Mong-Ling Chu et al., Epidemiology of Penicillin-Resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae Isolated in
Taiwan, /960-/990, 14 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 450 (1992).
50
DREXLER, supra note I 0, at 150.
51
Richard E. Lenski, The Cost of Antibiotic Resistance-from the Perspective of a Bacterium, in
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: ORIGIN, EVOLUTION, SELECTION AND SPREAD, supra note 41, at 13 7.
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were unstable, the plasmids encoding resistance became stable within a few
months. 52
Additional research over the last few years seems to strengthen Lenski's argument. There is a growing body of evidence demonstrating that
(i) the fitness costs of resistance are often small, and (ii) further evolution
quickly reduces or eliminates these costs.
[C]hromosomal drug resistance mutations studied often had only a small fitness cost; compensatory mutations were not involved in low-cost or no-cost
resistance mutations. When drug resistance mutations found in clinical isolates were considered, selection of those mutations that have little or no fitness
cost in the in vitro competition assay seems to occur. 53

Another study similarly found that although the first mutations conferring resistance are often unstable, subsequent mutations frequently stabilize
the change. 54 And a more recent study identified a specific second-stage
mutation that reduces or eliminates the fitness cost of resistance to penicillin without reducing the resistant capability at all. The authors in this latest
study speculated that "[t]his pattern of stability loss and restoration may be
common in the evolution of new enzyme activity." 55 Another study finding
that "adaptation to the fitness costs of [resistance] occurs by mitigation of
the deleterious effects of the resistance mutations (compensatory evolution)
rather than through reversion to the drug-sensitive state," further found that
there is "no obvious association between the magnitude of ... resistance
and its allied cost. " 56 In other words, there is no ground for hoping that the
most radical mutations-the ones that confer the most novel and effective
resistance to antibiotics-are less stable and thus less likely to persist. To
sum up, "[t]he data available from recent laboratory studies suggest that
most, but not all, resistance-determining mutations and accessory elements
engender some fitness cost, but those costs are likely to be ameliorated by
subsequent evolution. " 57
Lenski identified "repression" as one effective means by which a bacteria can minimize the fitness cost of resistance: the ability to turn off the
resistance function when it is not necessary (i.e., when the antibiotic is not
52

!d. at 138 (citing Marilyn C. Roberts et al., Molecular Characterization of Two -LactamaseSpecifYing P/asmids Isolated from Neisseria gonorrhoeae, 131 J. BACTERIOLOGY 557 ( 1977)).
53
Peter Sander et al., Fitness Cost of Chromosomal Drug Resistance-Conferring Mutations, 46
ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 1204, 1204 (2002).
54
Ivan Nagaev et al., Biological Cost and Compensatory Evolution in Fusidic Acid-Resistant
Staphylococcus aureus, 40 MOLECULAR MICROBIOLOGY 433 (2001).
55
Xiaojun Wang et al., Evolution of an Antibiotic Resistance Enzyme Constrained by Stability and
Activity Trade-ojft, 320 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 85, 85 (2002).
56
Mary G. Reynolds, Compensatory Evolution in Rifampin-Resistant Escherichia coli, 156
GENETICS 1471, 1478 (2000).
57
Dan I. Andersson & Bruce R. Levin, The Biological Cost of Antibiotic Resistance, 2 CURRENT
OPINION MICROBIOLOGY 489,489 (1999).
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present), combined with the ability to "switch on" resistance if and when
the antibiotic re-enters the microbe's environment. 58 Again, subsequent research has bolstered this theory. A study of staph. resistance to the antibiotic gentamicin demonstrated that
the emergence of [a resistant strain of staph. bacteria] following exposure to
gentamicin results from a rapid switch and that bacteria exposed to cycles of
[the antibiotic] gentamicin followed by antibiotic-free medium repeatedly
switched between a resistant [strain] and a sensitive [i.e., non-resistant] parental phenotype (revertants). [This result] suggests that [staph.] has evolved an
inducible and reversible resistance mechanism that circumvents a permanent
cost to fitness. 59

Even more troubling, when an antibiotic triggers such a switch, it may
tum on repressed resistance to multiple antibiotics. "[A] single antibiotic to
treat an infection can provoke resistance to other drugs .. . . One reason may
be a master switch-dubbed MAR, for Multiple Antibiotic Resistance-on
the cell's chromosome. 'It's almost as ifbacteria strategically anticipate the
confrontation of other drugs when they resist one ... . "'60
Another reason that resistance often persists even when the antibiotic is
not present is that the plasmids that confer resistance on their host bacteria
often provide other beneficial functionality. "Over time, plasmids and their
bacterial hosts can enter a symbiotic relationship, in which the growth of
the host depends on the plasmid-one reason that the drug resistance bestowed this way is hard to reverse." 61
These and related evolutionary mechanisms may well explain what is
perhaps the most discouraging evidence that we cannot restore usefulness to
antibiotics rendered impotent by past overuse: "the surprising persistence
of resistance to tetracycline and streptomycin"-two antibiotics that have
not been used heavily for decades. 62
Analyzing the fragrant contents of diapers from a daycare center, [Emory Professor Bruce] Levin found that a quarter of the E. coli lurking between the
folds resisted streptomycin, a drug rarely used in the last 30 years. Although
in evolutionary theory resistant bacteria are presumed to be more genetically
weighed down and therefore less fit to compete, Levin suspects that after E.
coli gains drug resistance, it evolves a second compensatory mutation that
keeps it from backsliding to a state of drug sensitivity.63

58

Lenski, supra note 51, at 133.
Ruth C. Massey et al., Phenotypic Switching of Antibiotic Resistance Circumvents Permanent
Costs in Staphylococcus aureus, II CURRENT BIOLOGY 1810, 1810 (2001).
60
DREXLER, supra note 10, at !50 (citation and quotation omitted).
61
/d. at 149.
62
Lenski, supra note 51 , at 138.
63
DREXLER, supra note I 0, at 149-50.
59
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Spanish doctors quit using tetracycline and chloramphenicol in the
early 1980s, yet after fifteen years the percentage of resistant strep. pneumoniae bacteria fell only by half. 64 Similarly, in East Germany, tetracycline-resistant E. coli bacteria responsible for urinary tract infections fell
only from 46% to 28% five years after termination of the use of tetracycline. Lenski found no comfort in these numbers.
While it may seem impressive that in five years the prevalence of resistance
drops from 46% to 28%, if you put the bacteria back under positive antibiotic
selection you have probably only bought yourself an extra week! It seems to
be much easier to get resistant 'bugs' than to get rid ofthem. 65

Summing up, Lenski notes that none of these discouraging findings
should be surprising.
[A] reduction in the cost of antibiotic resistance is not some mysterious or unexpected phenomenon. Instead, cost-reduction is a simple and general manifestation of the tendency for organisms to undergo genetic adaptation by
natural selection. Just as organisms may adapt to overcome adverse aspects of
their external environment (e.g. by becoming resistant to antibiotics), so too
may they adapt to overcome adverse aspects of their internal physiology (e.g.
by reducing harmful side-effects of resistance). Unfortunately, this trend implies that it will become increasingly difficult over time to control the spread
of resistant strains simply by suspending the usage of a particular antibiotic. 66

Others concur, finding that recent research "argue[s] against expectations that link decreased levels of antibiotic consumption with the decline in
the level of resistance. " 67
In some sense, we missed our chance by not withdrawing antibiotics
when resistance first appeared. "You would have to quit using penicillin
when you saw the first resistant strain, because once it has spread too far
you're never going to be able to return to complete susceptibility."68 Even
such a stringent policy might not restore usefulness indefinitely; "if you can
go 'cold turkey' right away, you may buy another ten years of susceptibility .... " 69 We may have missed another chance presented by the plethora
of novel antibiotics available in past decades, as it is more feasible to hold
back new antibiotics when there are numerous alternatives. "We have had
more classes of antimicrobial agents available to us in the 1980s than we
are likely to have in the foreseeable future." 70 Our overuse of antibiotics
seems to have made the bacterial population irreversibly more threatening.
64
65
66
67

68
69
70

Len ski, supra note 51, at 14 7 (comments of Baquero).
!d. at 149 (comments of Lenski).
!d. at 139.
Sander et al., supra note 53, at 1204.
Lenski, supra note 51, at 148 (comments ofLenski).
!d.
!d. at 150 (comments of Bennish).
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"The real problem is that it may be too late to react, in the sense that our
normal flora is now the normal resistant flora.'m
In the end, we are fighting a battle against the most powerful force in
biology: evolution. The development of resistance is not limited to microbes; Europeans developed enough of a resistance to smallpox that it did
not pose a pandemic threat by the 1600s. Unfortunately, it posed a genocidal threat to American Indians who had not. 72 Australians employed the
myxomatosis virus to decimate a rabbit population threatening to overrun
the continent. Initially the virus killed 99% of the rabbit population, but the
successors of the few survivors are now 50% resistant despite the introduction of successively more virulent strains of the virus. 73 No matter how lethal a future bacterial plague might be, some humans likely would survive.
By managing the use of existing, and especially of newly-developed antibiotics, we may have preserved enough of the effectiveness of antibiotics to
reduce the mortality rate from any such plague far below the ninety-nine
percent decimation suffered by Australia's rabbits. The remainder of this
Article explores optimal use of antibiotics given the biological constraints
discussed in this section.
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS
A plague is one of our greatest public health fears-an untreatable infection caused by a lethal mutant bacterial strain that passes easily between
persons (and perhaps other hosts). We already are experiencing isolated
deaths due to untreatable bacterial infections. 74 More generally, resistance
makes treating many infections more expensive. For example, curing a patient of penicillin-resistant gonorrhea costs twelve to fifteen times as much
as treating non-resistant cases. 75
Before commencing the economic analysis of antibiotic (over)use, it is
worth discussing why this Article does not consider substances for treating
other infections, e.g., viral or fungal. The reason for ignoring viruses is
simple: there are basically no broadly effective antiviral medications.
Without use, overuse cannot pose a problem. That said, if and when scientists identify effective antiviral drugs, we will face the same issues that we
face today vis-a-vis bacteria. Viruses mutate frequently and reproduce rap71

Levy, supra note 41, at II (comments of Baquero) (emphasis added).
See P. M. ASHBURN, THE RANKS OF DEATH: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF
AMERICA (Frank D. Ashburn ed., 1947); JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF
HUMAN SOCIETIES 195-214 (1997); Dean R. Snow & Kim Lanphear, European Contact and Indian
Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First Epidemics, 35 ETHNOHIST. 15, 17-24 (1988).
73
Shelly Parer, Economic & Ecological Impact of Rabbits: Myxomatosis (1995) (unpublished student paper, Australian Nat'l Univ.), at http://rubens.anu.edu.au/student.projects/rabbits/myxo.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2004).
74
See Brown, supra note 2.
75
OT A, supra note 18, at 60.
72
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idly, and so are likely to develop resistance to such medications. 76 Drugs to
treat other sorts of infections have induced resistant mutations; one example
is the malaria protozoa. Unlike bacteria, however, anti-malarials are not
used to treat a range of conditions, both low-value and high. Malaria is always a serious disease, and thus it is less clear that we gain anything by
adopting policies to limit current use. It might be, however, that too many
people travel to malarial zones, and that we need policies to discourage
those 'marginal' travelers who would not be willing to pay a price for antimalarial medication that reflected the extent to which current use erodes future efficacy of the drug.
A. The Fundamental Problem
As intimated in the previous paragraph, what makes antibiotics unusual
is that their very use undermines their future usefulness, as bacteria evolve
resistance. Clem Tisdell was first to point out this problem, in an article inexplicably ignored by subsequent scholarship. 77 Unless there is some
mechanism to force consumers to bear this cost when they buy antibiotics,
they will ignore it and the populace will overuse antibiotics relative to the
socially optimal level. To put this in stark terms, cheap and easy access to
antibiotics today means that people will use them for very minor infections,
and even for conditions that are likely caused by a virus or other microbe.
Bacteria will develop resistance, and the drug will then be unavailable to
treat life-threatening and seriously debilitating infections in the (possibly
near-term) future.
A simple example helps illustrate this problem. A patient goes to the
doctor with ear pain. Based on an initial examination, the doctor concludes
that the patient has an infection, and that there is a 75% chance that it is viral, and only a 25% chance that it is bacterial. In either case, the infection is
not serious; the patient is likely to experience two to three days of moderate
discomfort and then recover. A culture test, to determine whether the infection is bacterial or viral, takes a couple days and costs more than an antibiotic prescription. Weighing the modest cost of the drugs against a couple
days of discomfort, the patient is willing to pay for the antibiotics even
though she realizes that there is only a twenty-five percent chance that they
will provide any relief. Under these facts, the patient will press her doctor
for the prescription and likely obtain it: making patients happy is good for
business, and the specter of a malpractice suit if the infection turns out to be
bacterial and serious provides further impetus to write the prescription. 78
76

LESLIE COLLIER & JOHN OXFORD, HUMAN VIROLOGY 85 (2d ed. 2000).
Clem Tisdell, Exploitation of Techniques that Decline in Effectiveness with Use, 37 FINANCES
PUBLIQUE 428 ( 1982).
78
Many claims arise from cases involving infections. OTA, supra note 18, at 75 (citing ST. PAUL
FIRE & MARINE INS. Co., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS 4-5 (1995)); see also Nelson v.
Hammon, 802 P.2d 452, 457 (Colo. 1990) (holding that given American Heart Association guidelines
77
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The long-term cost of such episodes (multiplied by millions of doctor visits
a year) is lost lives in the future due to untreatable bacterial infections. Benign bacteria present in the patient's body, exposed to the antibiotic, will
tend to evolve resistance. As discussed in the previous section, these bacteria may then pass on resistance to other bacteria, or may migrate to parts of
the body in which their presence is infectious rather than benign. The patient is not assessed for this cost, however, and so makes a decision that,
while personally rational, is socially undesirable.
There are many equivalent ways to characterize the problem. Perhaps
most intuitively, the very use of antibiotics imposes an external cost on later
potential consumers. There is no easy way to establish a market to mediate
these conflicting uses. First and foremost, there is no way to identify the set
of future potential consumers-basically a random collection of individuals
who will contract serious bacterial infections years in the future. Even if we
could identify these future buyers, it is difficult to imagine how they could
pay present low-value users to refrain from using antibiotics. They certainly could not proceed individually; some sort of group action would be
necessary on both sides.
Remedying this externality is even more difficult when future generations will bear the cost of their predecessors' overuse of antibiotics. If bacteria develop resistance within the expected lives of most citizens living
today, each citizen has a personal incentive to support policies eliminating
the externality. If the process takes more than a generation, however, their
incentives are second-order-the welfare of their children. Will the living
give sufficient weight to the welfare of their progeny? The base problem is
that there is no way for future generations to pay their predecessors to
economize on antibiotic use. 79
As Tisdell notes, current buyers are unlikely to refrain from use out of
the goodness of their hearts. "[E]ven if users are aware of the unfavorable
externality, actirig individually they are unlikely to restrict the use of the
technique for the collective good .... [It] is akin to the prisoners' dilemma
problem." 80 This is another way to view externalities: as a collective action
problem. Although everyone knows that using antibiotics in many cases is
irrational in the long run, without some mechanism to ensure that others
will behave, no one refrains.
The common pool model offers yet a third way to characterize the
problem. Common here means the absence of property rights. When no
one has property rights, and an asset is part of the great unclaimed comand testimony by infectious disease specialists, surgeon had duty to patient to prescribe antibiotics to
prevent possibility of serious bacterial infection entering patient's bloodstream); Hellwig v. Pot! uri, No.
90-C-55, 1991 WL 285712, at *I (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1991) (holding physician liable for failing to
prescribe antibiotics to patient who stepped on a rusty nail).
79
TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL CHALLENGES: AN APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL, POLITICAL, AND
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 76-82 ( 1997).
80
Tisdell, supra note 77, at 429.
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mons, an asset grab occurs. The customary example is a fishery: if anyone
can fish, a flood of participants will exhaust the stock rapidly. Given the
ability of fish to regenerate if harvested judiciously (e.g., throwing back
small fish; not fishing during certain times of year; generally, leaving in the
water a population sufficient to regenerate itself), such hasty depletion is
likely suboptimal. 81
However we choose to model the problem, any solution must somehow
discourage some present low-value use to preserve the potency of antibiotics for future high-value cases. In terms of the standard demand curve, we
need to eliminate purchases by those at the bottom of the curve in early periods so that there are doses left to service the high part of the curve in later
periods.
high

value

low
vatue

quantity
FIGURE l

Gardner and Layton, apparently unaware of Tisdell's work, constructed a more sophisticated model and reached the same general conclusion: sound policy should somehow deter low-value uses and preserve
effectiveness for future high-value uses.
Essentially, the social planner saves some of the treatments for future generations. In the unregulated case, no one 'owns' the treatments, and so there is no
incentive to save them . . . . Some individuals will not now treat their disease,
because it is 'too' expensive and some diseases no longer will be treated with

81 For a discussion of the classic "common pool" situation, a fishery with no restraints on entry, see,
for example, PHILIP A. NEHER, NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS: CONSERVATION AND EXPLOITATION
11-59 (1990). For typical legal applications of the concept, see Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The
Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States , 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 589 (2002);
Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 645 (1992).
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antibiotics because the benefits do not exceed the full cost to society. The
treatment will be saved for someone more sick in the future. 82

They highlight the trade-off between (high-value) human and (lowvalue) animal use of antibiotics (as a growth enhancer in livestock, discussed supra Part II) in even starker terms.
Put provocatively to emphasize the point, when both humans and animals use
antibiotics we are equating the economic value of improving human life a bit
more with extra pounds of beef .... [H) ow are vegetarians of any nationality
compensated for the fact that we might one day in the future exhaust our miracle drugs so that others can have cheaper beef today? 83

B. Generalizing the Problem: The Exhaustible Resource Model

The previous subsection noted that one way to conceptualize the problem of antibiotic overuse was to view the resource as a common pool in
which nobody has property rights. The analogy drawn to a fishery is not
quite accurate. Antibiotics do not have the ability to reproduce themselves.84 Perhaps surprisingly, the proper analogy is to exhaustible resources, such as minerals. Although we can manufacture as many doses of
penicillin as we please, over time more and more bacteria will achieve resistance. When most bacteria have such resistance, an antibiotic is 'exhausted.' Thus, the number of effective doses of an antibiotic is limited, in
almost exactly the same sense that the number of barrels of oil on the Earth
is limited. This subsection introduces the economics of exhaustible resources, and discusses the application of this theory to the special case of
antibiotics.
1. Basic Model.-Exhaustible resources' defining characteristicexhaustibility-requires a different economic analysis than conventional,
reproducible goods. If there is a fixed, finite amount of some good (say,
coal), then a decision to consume the good today forecloses future options:
to consume that unit in a year, in ten years, or a hundred. This does not
hold for more typical reproducible goods, such as paper. If demand for
wheat unexpectedly rises in the future, past consumption in no way limits
suppliers' ability to crank up production. Owners of exhaustible resources
(public or private) thus must consider the ramifications of present use for
future availability in a way that producers of reproducible goods do not. 85
82

Gardner Brown & David Layton, Resistance Economics: Social Cost and the Evolution of Antibiotic Resistance, I ENV'T & DEV. ECON. 349, 354 (1996).
83
/d. at 355.
84 Note that to the extent antibiotics could regain usefulness if shelved for some period, they would
share with a fishery a self-reproductive nature. Some models of optimal use of antibiotics rely on this
analogy, infra Part IV.F, but, as previously discussed, supra Part II, the most recent scientific evidence
suggests that reversing resistance by pulling antibiotics from use will not work.
85
NEHER, supra note 81, at 271-86.
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Although most explications of exhaustible resource economics stress
the famous "Hotelling rule," that the price (or "rental") of such resources
will rise at the interest rate, 86 the basic insight about the special nature of
exhaustible resources is best illustrated by assuming that the interest rate is
zero (i.e., ignoring it). This treats as equal welfare in the present and all future periods.
This equality of present and future welfare would seem to obviate the
need to carefully plan the timing of consumption of an exhaustible resource.
If, however, producers face rising costs (as is often the case), the producer
of an exhaustible resource will behave differently than the producer of a renewable good. Imagine that a large number of miners own all of the
world's gold deposits. All face the same costs, and, since they are small,
their output has no effect on price-they are classic competitive market
"price takers." We can use the following standard supply and demand diagram to contrast the profit-maximizing behavior of exhaustible and reproducible good producers.

average

demand

CO$t

curve

quantity

FIGURE2

To maximize profits, the supplier of a reproducible good keeps making
units until the market price just covers the cost of the last unit mademarginal cost. The flat demand curve means that marginal revenue equals
market price. Thus, we have a well-known result from the economics of the

86

See infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
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firm: to maximize profits, produce up to the point where marginal costs
rise to equal marginal revenue. 87
This standard economic logic does not work for exhaustible resources.
Supplying a quantity up to the reproducible output level today means that
there will be fewer units to sell later. These same units could have been
produced at lower cost in a subsequent period; this is because costs are rising at the reproducible profit-maximizing output level. The producer of an
exhaustible resource could increase profits by selling less now and more in
the future. Taking this cost minimization logic to its limit, the exhaustible
resource seller will always produce at that level of output that minimizes
average (per unit) cost in each period. Given that the price (i.e., demand)
does not change over time or with variations in output, this strategy yields
the maximal possible profit on the producer's fixed supply of the good.
Note that the exhaustible resource firm, despite the fact that it operates
in a competitive market, earns positive economic profits-its total revenues
(price x units sold) exceed its total costs (per unit cost x units sold). This
difference, called rent, is the return on the exhaustible resource. If a firm
buys a stock of an exhaustible resource, it will pay a price that reflects this
future stream of rents. In that case, we can see, there are not really any true
economic profits; the difference between price and average cost is just sufficient to recompense the buyer of the exhaustible resource for its purchase
price.
Our assumption that interest rates are zero is unrealistic, of course. In
order to focus on the effect of interest rates on the supply of exhaustible resources, we now assume that costs of production are zero. This is not entirely at odds with reality; costs are a small fraction of price for many lowcost oil producers, and for drugs with patent protection.
The real import of considering positive interest rates is that we are now
considering a world in which there are multiple assets among which investors may choose. Our mindset becomes that of an investor assembling a
portfolio of assets in which to invest. To simplify, we assume that there are
only two assets: the exhaustive resource and government bonds that pay
some fixed, positive interest rate.
Government bonds, like most financial assets, can provide investors
with two types of gain. The periodic interest payments are direct income.
If the market interest rate changes, the price of the bonds themselves may
rise (or fall); this is a capital gain (or loss).
Exhaustible resources, unlike bonds, yield no direct income like interest payments or the dividends paid by most stocks. The only way in which
an exhaustible resource owner can earn a positive return is by capital
gains-which is just an increase in the price of the resource.
87

WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY : BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS

358 (3d

ed. 1985).

631
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 631 2004-2005

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

We are interested in determining the equilibrium conditions necessary
for investors to hold both bonds and supplies of the exhaustible resource. If
one asset or the other would yield an unambiguously higher return, every
investor would desire that asset and no one would want to hold the other.
Such conditions, where nobody wants one of the assets, cannot be in equilibrium. In equilibrium, the total return of the two assets, direct income
plus capital gains, must be equal. Only then will investors be willing to
hold both.
To simplify matters, we assume that the return on the exhaustible resource is riskless, so that investors demand no risk premium for investing in
it. We also assume that the price of bonds does not change, eliminating the
possibility of capital gains on bonds. The total return on bonds is then simply the direct income they yield in the form of interest payments. As noted
above, the total return on the exhaustible resource consists of capital gains
in the form of price increases. Thus equilibrium requires that the rate of
price increases for the resource equal the interest rate on bonds.
To see why this is the only equilibrium, consider the two alternatives to
equality of bond interest rates and resource price increase rates. If resource
prices increase at a rate below the interest rate on bonds, all producers will
extract every unit today so that they can invest the proceeds in bonds and
watch their wealth grow more quickly than it would if they let the resource
remain in the ground. 88 This flood of supply will drive the price of the resource down to a very low level. Assuming the market demand curve has
significant slope, then any supplier wise enough to hold back his supply
will be able to sell her small quantity-the only supply available-at a high
price in the next period. This later price may exceed the earlier price by a
percent greater than the interest rate; if so, all the suppliers who sold will
wish they had not. Thus, prices increasing more slowly than the interest
rate cannot be if interest rates are positive.
The other possibility, where the resource price increases at a rate exceeding the interest rate on bonds, is also an unstable (i.e., not an equilibrium). Under this condition, we would observe exactly the opposite of the
situation described in the previous paragraph. With the capital gains (price
increases) from simply sitting on the resource exceeding the interest income
of bonds, investors would stampede to sell bonds and buy the exhaustible
resource. Thus the only equilibrium path for prices is to increase at precisely the rate of interest; this is called the Hotelling Rule. 89 The following
diagram illustrates how industry supply "creeps up" the demand curve, sup-

88
This extreme result is due to our assumption that production is costless; if there are production
costs, they would place some constraint on the rate of extraction, though our analysis in general will still
hold. This assumption leads to almost identical results as assuming that marginal costs are positive but
constant-i.e., per unit cost does not rise or fall with quantity produced.
89
See Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON . 137 (1931).
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plying smaller and smaller quantities at higher and higher prices; it assumes
an interest rate of ten percent.
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end? It ends at the "choke price," where demand disappears. The beginning is a little more subtle. Given this terminal point as defined by the
choke price, the initial price and quantity combination from the demand
curve (quantity q 1, at price of ten) is set so that, if prices rise at the rate of
interest, the sequence of quantities that follow will add up to the total supply of the exhaustible resource. 90
If we admit positive costs, the basic story still holds, but the quantity
that must increase at the rate of interest is not the price, but rents on the exhaustible resource: price less cost. This embodies the return on the resource itself; the costs of production represent payments to labor and capital
hired to extract the resource.
2. Property Rights Problem Remains.-Perhaps the most surprising
result in the study of exhaustible resources is that, for competitive exhaustible resource markets satisfying idealistic market conditions, the supply decisions of competing sellers leads to socially optimal use. As long as no
owner or group of owners of the resource has monopoly power, their pri90
Although the analysis is more complex, the same argument holds if there is no choke price, i.e.,
the demand curve approaches a zero quantity for very high prices but never actually goes to zero. Intuitively, the size of the quantities demanded at very high prices get extremely small-so small that even
though we are summing an infinite number of them, the sum is finite. As long as income and wealth,
external parameters, are finite, demand for any product cannot be infinite.
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vate interests will lead them to deplete the resource at precisely the same
rate as a benevolent social planner. At bottom, this is simply an application
of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics, which says, roughly, that a
competitive market without externalities (or other distortions) leads to an
efficient allocation of all goods. 91
There are a couple of direct implications of this market-efficiency result. First, it tells us that the behavior of monopolists generally is suboptimal for exhaustible resources just as it is for 'normal' non-exhaustible
goods. This Article will discuss this at some length in Part IV.D, when examining the effect of patents on the market for antibiotics.
More fundamentally, the antibiotics market does not satisfy the conditions of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics for the reason discussed
supra Part IV.A. To recap the argument, the fact that present use of antibiotics erodes future usefulness, combined with a lack of property rights in
antibiotics, creates a negative externality. There is in effect a missing market, between future sufferers of serious bacterial infections and present sufferers of mild and possibly non-bacterial infections. Without some
mechanism to discourage current low-value uses, it is not surprising that we
cannot count on private ordering to produce socially optimal results.

3. Differing Focus in Applying the Exhaustible Resource Model.The basic (dosage effect only) exhaustible resource models provides a
more sophisticated setting in which to study the root problem identified by
Tisdell, the externality that exists because use of antibiotics erodes future
usefulness. Other recent scholarship using this approach has focused on a
different set of issues. Borrowing methods from epidemiology, these more
detailed models factor in effects not contained in our simple models. 92 First,
they account for the fact that antibiotics confer a positive external benefit:
cured patients are less likely to spread the disease. Second, they explicitly
examine the issues raised by the existence of multiple antibiotics, with differing levels of resistance to each.
In other ways, these models are more limited. Of paramount importance, they do not distinguish between high-value and low-value uses of antibiotics. By assuming that cures to all infections are of equal value, these
models cannot study the fundamental trade-off in antibiotic use policy. 93
They are instead designed to model the course of a specific infection in a
91

DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MJCROECONOMIC THEORY 199-205 (1990). Efficiency here
means Pareto optimality: nobody can be made better off without reducing the welfare of someone else.
92
Sebastian Bonhoeffer et al., Evaluating Treatment Protocols to Prevent Antibiotic Resistance, 94
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12, I 06 ( 1997); Ramanan Laxminarayan, Bacterial Resistance and the Optimal Use of Antibiotics, RESOURCES FOR FUTURE (June 2001) (unpublished discussion paper 01-23), at
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-OI-23.pdf(last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
93
Laxminarayan explicitly values the cure of all infections equally. Laxminarayan, supra note 92,
at 7. Bonhoeffer eta!. use a number of welfare measures that implicitly do the same. Bonhoeffer et al. ,
supra note 92, at 12, I 06-{)8.
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closed environment such as a hospital; this Article, following Tisdell, focuses on the more general, worldwide problem.
This Article ignores the positive externality of antibiotic use (reduction
in spread of bacterial infections) as a second order effect. Patients will often spread the disease before they are diagnosed and given antibiotics, and
they can continue to spread the infection even when taking antibiotics, up to
the time they are cured (free of the infectious agent). This positive externality is much more significant for vaccines, since those vaccinated can never
become a breeding ground for a particular infection. The bottom line is
that, in the long run, this paper assumes that the negative externality stemming from excessive use far outweighs any positive externalities antibiotics
offer.
C. Policy Alternative One: Pigovian Tax and Related Mechanisms

Maintaining our focus on this fundamental trade-off between current
use and future usefulness, this section and the next analyze the efficacy of
government policies designed to curb present use so that antibiotics retain
their efficacy for serious infections in the future. This section first casts serious doubt on the medical community's "command and control" proposals
to deal with overuse of antibiotics. It then discusses the classic solution to
negative externalities, a tax on the undesirable conduct (here, use of antibiotics), and some related subsidies for goods that reduce the need for antibiotics (tests to determine the cause of infections; vaccines that obviate the
need for antibiotics). Part IV .D discusses the pros and cons of patent rights
as a solution to the lack of property rights in antibiotics.

1. The Medical Community's Command/Control Response.-With
the crumbling of the Iron Curtain and the economic reforms in China, command and control as a means to allocate scarce resources (i.e., run an economy) is generally on the wane. It retains a rather shocking vitality,
however, in proposed solutions to the overuse of antibiotics. Major medical
organizations, medical researchers, and legal commentators all have focused exclusively on regulatory command, along with education and jawboning (trying to persuade people to act selflessly and refrain from the antisocial overuse of antibiotics), as the proper tools for reducing low-value
uses of antibiotics.
A major congressional study of the overuse of antibiotics conducted in
1995 contains not one significant discussion of using prices or other economic levers to address overuse of antibiotics, perhaps because the expert
panel that authored the study included not a single economist or social policy expert. 94 In discussing the costs of controlling emergence of resistant
strains, the report discusses various aspects of hospitals' financial incen94
OTA, supra note 18. This repon does mention extending patents for manufacturers of new antibiotics willing to limit sales to patients infected with bacteria resistant to existing drugs. I d. at 18.
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tives with nary a word about imposing a tax to alter those incentives. 95 It
suggests, inter alia, detailed rules and 'formularies' to regulate the use of
antibiotics. 96
Three years later, in 1998, the Center for Science in the Public Interest
suggested the following measures to deal with the problem:
• national funding for programs to educate health professionals and
the public on the problem of antibiotic overuse;
• require tests to identify infectious agents before prescribing antibiotics;
• use government hospitals as "showcases" for the prudent use of
antibiotics;
• require hospitals receiving federal Medicare/Medicaid dollars to
offer vaccinations; and
• limits or bans on some agricultural and husbandry uses of antibiotics, along with education for farmers. 97
Just two years ago, the high-powered Interagency Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance, composed of all the major governmental agencies
with an interest in health policy, listed as its top priority items:
• a society-wide education campaign, and
• "educational and behavioral interventions" to assist doctors in
curbing antibiotic use. 98
Not one of these large-scale policy documents authored by sophisticated governmental and private institutions so much as contemplates using
taxation or other mechanisms to alter private incentives.
The same criticism applies to policy proposals from the medical academy. A recent editorial in the leading American medical journal advocated
the use of traditional and computerized practice guidelines and education
95

/d. at 93.
Id. at 11-12.
97
Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Protecting the Crown Jewels of Medicine, A Strategic Plan to
Preserve the Effectiveness of Antibiotics (1998), at http://www.cspinet.org/reports/abiotic.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
98
Interagency Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance, A Public Health Action Plan to Combat AnDomestic Issues, 21-22 (June 5, 2002), available at
timicrobial Resistance:
Part 1:
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/actionplan/aractionplan.pdf. The Task Force consisted of the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the National Institutes of
Health ("NIH"), the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Health Resources and Services
Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans
Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the U.S. AID, and the Agency for Health Research and Quality.
96
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(of both doctors and their patients) to discourage overuse of antibiotics. 99
Another study made much the same recommendations, along with advocating restrictions on some uses of antibiotics. 100 Legal commentators similarly have focused their recommendations almost exclusively on regulation
and education. 101
The efficacy of such measures is questionable. Education will not lead
a self-interested patient to refrain from requesting antibiotics. Indeed, full
knowledge of the private benefits of indiscriminate antibiotic use may lead
to more, rather than less, antibiotic use. Jawboning seems best understood
as attempting to instill a new norm that people will obey based on either an
internal moral voice or on the disapproval and informal sanction of others.
Ingraining a new norm may take a long time, as this is best done with children. Relying on social disapproval and informal sanctions seems unlikely
to work well, as the use, and especially the overuse of antibiotics is largely
secret. Attempting to recruit doctors to express disapproval of patients who
request antibiotics excessively also is problematic, both because physicians
have special duties to their patients, and because competition among doctors means that patients can simply switch doctors if refused a desired prescription.
The case against direct command-and-control regulation is subtler.
Regulating antibiotics entails a strict limit on the number of doses administered, or strict guidelines on use. For a government with complete information, these measures might be sensible. If, however, doctors and their
patients have better information on the costs and benefits of the various
uses of antibiotics, top-down regulation in effect prevents them from using
this information in deciding when to use antibiotics and when to refrain
from use. A tax or subsidy, on the other hand, by its very nature, will
eliminate only lower-value uses. It permits the parties 'on the ground' dealing with the problem to draw on their superior information when they decide where and when to economize on the use of a taxed resource.
Moreover, the costs of enforcing command-style regulation of antibiotic use might be quite high. Some governmental agency would need to
monitor millions of prescriptions a year and somehow ferret out cases of
misuse. We should expect that most patients and their doctors would not
cooperate, but rather might scheme together to circumvent laws that, in
their view, unfairly deprive a patient of potentially helpful antibiotic treat99

Benjamin Schwartz et al., Editorial, Preventing the Emergence of Antimicrobial Resistance: A
Call to Action by Clinicians, Public Health Officials, & Patients, 278 JAMA 944 (1997).
100
Rosamund J. Williams & David L. Heymann, Containment of Antibiotic Resistance, 279
SCIENCE 1153 (1998) .
101
See Scott B. Markow, Note, Penetrating the Walls of Drug-Resistant Bacteria: A Statutory Prescription to Combat Antibiotic Misuse, 87 GEO. L.J. 531 (1998) (advocates using Medicare and Medicaid rules layered on top of state regulation); Michael Misocky, Comment, The Epidemic of Antibiotic
Resistance: A Legal Remedy to Eradicate the "Bugs " in the Treatment of Infectious Diseases, 30
AKRON L. REV. 733 (1997) (similar regulatory approach).
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ment. It would require very extensive monitoring of prescription practices
to enforce national mandates on the use of antibiotics. The government
would have to hire inspectors to keep close tabs on all antibiotic prescriptions nationwide. This is an expensive proposition. Given doctors' and patients' incentives, and the ease of lying about the variety of infections being
treated, monitoring prescriptions might prove insufficient. Another set of
inspectors would need to devise some means to detect such fraudulent practices-adding on yet more costs.
For these reasons, this Article proceeds on the premise that 'hard' economic incentives, such as taxes, subsidies, and changes in patent rights, are
much more effective measures than legislative fiat, jawboning, and education.

2. Pigovian Taxation.-Perhaps the most common solution to negative externalities like the one caused by antibiotic use is the imposition of a
tax that forces those creating such external costs to "internalize" (take into
account) the burdens they impose on others. These are called Pigovian
taxes, in honor of A.C. Pigou, the first economist to discuss such a measure
formally. 102 In his seminal article on overuse of antibiotics, Tisdell proposed just such a tax. 103
Neither Tisdell nor anyone else, however, has considered the implications of the exhaustible resource model for Pigovian taxation of antibiotics.
For most negative externalities, such as pollution, the Pigovian tax per unit
remains constant-the harm from pollution, as a baseline assumption, does
not vary over time. Such a constant tax, however, will not work for antibiotics. Recall that efficiency requires the cost to consumers of an exhaustible resource to increase over time at the rate of interest. Only such a rising
tax will limit use over time efficiently, by raising the price paid by consumers and thus imposing an ever-rising disincentive to use. If the initial price
is set incorrectly, the price will be suboptimal in all succeeding periods.
The Pigovian tax, then, is subject to larger cumulative errors in the context
of exhaustible resources.
That said, there is evidence that such a price mechanism and the law of
demand (quantity demanded varies inversely with price) would work for
antibiotics. When Iceland stopped subsidizing the price of antibiotics, use
fell significantly. 104 Congruently, an Australian commentator has blamed
the continuance of such subsidies for exacerbating antibiotic resistance in
that nation. 105
102

A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).

103

Tisdell, supra note 77, at 432.

104

Joan Stephenson, Icelandic Researchers Are Showing the Way to Bring Down Rates of Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria, 275 JAMA 175 ( 1996).
105
D.P. Doessel, The "Sleeper" Issue in Medicine: Clem Tisdell 's Academic Scribbling on the
Economics of Antibiotic Resistance, 25 INT ' L J. SOC. ECON . 956 (\998).
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The higher prices resulting from Pigovian taxation would indirectly induce many of the measures that would be difficult to implement by direct
regulation. For instance, if it is true that supplementing animal feed with
antibiotics to enhance growth is one of the lowest-value uses of the drugs,
these will be among the first consumers taxed out of the market. As long as
the cost of the tax exceeds the benefits of growth enhancement, livestock
producers will discontinue their use. Similarly, higher prices would lead
those with mild infections, especially when the infection is likely viral, to
refrain from using antibiotics. This is precisely what the tax is supposed to
do: push those who value antibiotics the least out of the market. 106

3. Subsidizing Tests.-The higher prices for antibiotics resulting
from Pigovian taxation would also create greater incentives for using various tests to determine if an infection is bacterial, and, if so, whether the bug
is resistant to any antibiotics. The potential value of such tests is significant. According to one panel of experts, "[t]he most powerful weapons in
the arsenal directed at antibiotic-resistant bacteria are techniques for the
rapid and accurate identification of bacteria and determination of their susceptibility to antibiotics. " 107
At present, most such tests are expensive and time-consuming. Culturing and identifying microbes extracted from patients can take weeks. If a
test determines that the infection is bacterial rather than viral, lab technicians must then undertake a second battery of tests to ascertain those antibiotics to which the germ is resistant. There are, however, a few new tests on
the horizon that yield results much more rapidly. Results from a throat
swab can determine if strep. bacteria are causing an infection in about fifteen minutes. 108 Such progress, however, appears to be the exception rather
than the rule: "rapid technologies that would produce useful diagnostic results during the course of an office visit are not on the immediate horizon."109
Past scholarship has not discussed an additional efficient policy that is
the mirror image of the Pigovian tax on antibiotics: a Pigovian subsidy to
lower the cost of such tests. Because they will reduce the use of antibiotics,
tests confer a positive external benefit on future patients with serious infections who will need the drugs. In addition to subsidizing the cost of such
tests, the state might wish to subsidize research to develop faster and more

106

Infra Part JV.I (discussing the distributional and equity issues raised by higher prices for antibi-

otics).

107

OT A, supra note 18, at 24.
Children's Clinic of Southwest Louisiana, Inc., at http://www.childrensclinicofswla.com/laboratory.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004) ("If strep throat is suspected, she will swab the throat for a rapid
strep test. ... Within 10-15 minutes your physician will return with the lab results and continue his
exam."). Note that this test does not determine what resistances, if any, the bacteria possess.
109
OTA, supra note 18, at 51-52.
108

639
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 639 2004-2005

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

accurate tests. The remainder of this subsection explains the economics behind these policy recommendations.
Testing for the type of microbe responsible for an infection, in order to
limit antibiotic use to cases involving a susceptible target, adds a second
policy dimension. Our first dimension, in effect, was serious versus nonserious illnesses. A Pigovian tax addresses this distinction by pricing the
non-serious cases out of the market for antibiotics. Testing introduces a
second dimension: illnesses caused by bacteria susceptible to a given antibiotic versus all other sources of infection for which the antibiotic would be
useless (viruses, other microbes, and resistant strains of bacteria).
In a world without any tests to determine microbial susceptibility to antibiotics, there is no choice but to deploy antibiotics in all serious cases
where it is even moderately likely that the drug will work-the alternative
would be to never use antibiotics. This illustrates that, although a Pigovian
tax will price non-serious cases out of the market, it cannot address this
second source of counterproductive use of antibiotics, in cases where an infection will not respond to such treatment.
If such tests 110 are available, a now-familiar issue arises: individual and
societal welfare gains from such tests diverge, for reasons quite similar to
the negative externality of antibiotic use. Private decisions will compare
the costs of the test (defined broadly, to include items such as the psychic
expense of postponing treatment until the test results are available) to the
expected cost of the antibiotic, its price multiplied by the percent chance
that the drug would not help.
To illustrate, assume that there is a twenty-five percent chance that an
antibiotic will not work in a specific case, and that the antibiotic costs $10.
If a test to determine the efficacy of the drug costs $1, then a risk-neutral
patient would pay for the test, as the expected saving from using the test,
$2.50 (twenty-five percent chance it saves $1 0) exceeds the cost of the test.
If the test costs more than $2.50, however, it is not in the patient's selfinterest to use the test.
These personal calculations, however, ignore the social benefit that
arises when patients use the test: reducing current prescriptions by twentyfive percent, thus preserving those effective doses for future serious susceptible infections. 111 Continuing with the numerical example from the previ11

°

For simplicity, we assume that a single test both identifies the infectious agent and, if it is bacte·
rial, determines its resistance to antibiotics.
111
The exhaustible resource model implies that the number of effective doses is fixed. Doses not
administered today are effective tomorrow on a one-to-one basis. This, admittedly, is a simplification.
The evolution of bacterial resistance likely is more complicated. For example, the geographical dispersion of use might well affect the speed with which bacteria develop resistance. The scientific literature
contains no precise measurement of the factors that determine the rate at which bacteria develop resistance. Part II, supra, cited some findings ; in particular research suggesting that, once developed, resistance is unlikely to disappear. Part IV .H, infra, discusses models in which resistance evolves with the
pure passage of time, regardless of the number of doses administered.
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ous paragraph, assume that a future victim of a susceptible infection would
be willing to pay (in present value terms) $20 to insure that present users
did not exhaust an antibiotic. Then there is an additional social gain of $5
(a $20 gain in twenty-five percent of cases) from the use of the test. From
the viewpoint of social optimality, then, we want patients to take the test as
long as it costs less than $7.50 (private gain of $2.50 from potential saving
in personal antibiotic costs, plus this $5 social gain due to preserving the efficacy of the antibiotic). In terms of the table presented above, using the
test gives us additional discrimination power, beyond a Pigovian tax, to
economize on the use of antibiotics in serious cases where the drugs will do
no good.
Non-serious
Bacterial
Viral, ...

1

Serious

~Ji9v;!?d\~,W:i~.io~t'"i

proper cases for treatment

!.. ·M ·'·ir"•.fgO,(,~~~~~~i'' ,;ji,. :il;, .ijr.•ifl:.;Jf;nled opt;;pyls~~~t,":~iw ,~i;.:ciikij,.,,;
TABLE

1

Generalizing these insights into more general economic terms, an affordable test in effect reduces the demand for the antibiotic, as illustrated
here. In an exhaustible resource market, a decrease in demand stretches out
the useful life of the commodity. The sequence of prices that would exhaust the resource in a world of higher demand no longer do so. In the face
of lower demand, then, the initial price of the resource is lower, it rises at
the rate of interest (Hotelling's rule), and, finally, it takes longer to reach
the "choke price" at which demand ceases.
This means that, consistent with the implications of the simple numerical examples above, the test stretches out the useful life of the antibiotic.
Recall from those examples that purely private incentives will lead to less
than optimal use of tests for antibiotic efficacy. This is simply the inverse
of the overuse of antibiotics in the absence of a Pigovian tax. Such overuse
presented a negative externality; potential users of the test provide a positive externality. In such cases, the state should offer a subsidy to lower the
price of tests for antibiotic efficacy. A properly calibrated subsidy will increase use of the test to a level consistent with maximizing its utility to society as well as to individuals.

4. Subsidizing Vaccines.-Tests to determine the nature and resistance of infectious agents are not the only source of positive externalities in
antibiotic policy. Vaccines (treatments that prevent infection in the first
place) offer two positive externalities, one enmeshed with antibiotic policy,
the other independent of our concerns. Most policy analysis of vaccines focuses on the latter: for many diseases, vaccinated individuals cannot carry
the pathogen, and thus cannot serve as a vector to spread it. Unvaccinated
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people pose a positive threat to the community; hence laws often mandate
vaccinations (frequently at a price of zero, to spur compliance). 112
The second, to-date-ignored positive external effect implicates antibiotic policy: anyone vaccinated against bacterial disease X will never need
an antibiotic for the disease, as the vaccine renders them immune. If everyone is vaccinated against disease X, the disease itself may disappear, and
the antibiotic can be deployed against diseases Y and Z (for which there
may be no effective vaccination).
As with the use of the tests discussed in the previous section, this (with
some positive probability) translates into an incremental effective dose of
the antibiotic in the future. It seems very difficult, however, to find a way
for a future beneficiary of this preserved effective dose to compensate the
vaccinated party, and we have the now-familiar positive externality. As
with the test in the previous section, the government should subsidize the
price of vaccinations because, in addition to helping control the spread of
disease, they economize on the use of our exhaustible supply of antibiotics.
For similar reasons, the government might want to subsidize vaccination research. Given the ready availability of many antibiotics over the last
fifty-odd years, the market for such vaccines may have been stunted. Now
that we are beginning to realize that antibiotics are an exhaustible resources,
it may be sensible to invest public funds in vaccines-and any other similar
treatments that will reduce the extent to which we dip into the limited pool
of effective doses of antibiotics.

5. Subsidizing or Socializing Information Gathering-Governmental
information gathering, or subsidization of private efforts, may comprise another efficient tool in societal efforts to preserve the effectiveness of antibiotics. For example, data on the statistical likelihood that various symptoms
result from a given bacteria, along with data on the likelihood that each antibiotic will work against that bacteria, might offer a rough-and-ready, costeffective way to decide quickly what antibiotic, if any, to prescribe. Similarly, data on the geographic spread of resistant strains could enable doctors
to target antibiotic usage more narrowly and effectively.
Here, as is common for the production of information, private incentives to construct the data may be suboptimal. First, it is difficult to exclude
anyone from obtaining the information; once it is revealed, controlling its
spread is problematic. This will make it difficult for producers of such in112
Massachusetts passed the first law mandating vaccinations, requiring all school children to receive vaccination against smallpox. John Duffy, School Vaccinations: The Precursor ro School Medical Inspection, 33 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Scl. 344, 346 (1978). "By the 1980-81 school year, all 50
states had [mandatory vaccines] covering students first entering school." Kevin M. Malone & Alan R.
Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative & Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC
HEALTH PRACTICE (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2003). The Supreme Court ruled that mandatory
vaccination programs are constitutional in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II (1905) (holding state
law requiring smallpox vaccination did not violate any Due Process Clause liberty interest).
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formation to generate enough revenue to cover their costs. A few early purchasers can resell or gift away the information. Potential producers, foreseeing their inability to get paid for assembling the informational data, will
simply refrain from engaging in such an unrewarding enterprise.
Moreover, use of the information is non-rivalrous: unlike a hamburger,
"consumption" of the information to treat patient X in no way makes the information unavailable or useless to patient Y. Under such circumstances,
the optimal price for this public good is zero. Private markets cannot provide efficient amounts of such goods. 113
Admittedly, in some cases private parties may have incentives to produce some of this information. For example, a firm that has developed a
new antibiotic (over which it has a patent-created monopolyY 14 might find it
profitable to garner data demonstrating to doctors and their patients that this
new drug works where existing antibiotics do not. There is indeed such
private data-gathering. 115 In general, however, it seems unlikely that private
parties will have incentives to produce all of the wide variety of data useful
in economizing on the use of antibiotics.
At present, there is no national program for compiling data on the
prevalence and types of resistant bacteria. Some states collect relatively
limited data; even this has proved productive. For example, one such database enabled the state of Washington to pinpoint quickly the cause of an
outbreak of e.coli infections. Nevada, without a reporting and monitoring
apparatus, had a similar outbreak that lasted much longer, and for which the
state never did identify the source of the infection (making recurrence more
likely). 116 Unfortunately, the trend over the last decade or so has been less,
rather than more, governmental surveillance of the resistant bacteria
threat. 117

D. Policy Alternative Two: Patents
In sketching the regime of public information gathering, subsidies for
tests, and taxes on antibiotics necessary to deter inefficient overuse of antibiotics, the discussion in the previous section was notably silent on the
magnitude of the information gathered, the subsidies given, or the taxes im-

113

NICHOLSON, supra note 87, at 706-16.
Patents are discussed at length in Part IV.D.
115
Antimicrobe Spy Network, 277 SCIENCE 185 (1997). Note that the government cannot compel
private information owners to disclose data without paying just compensation. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding that trade secret is a compensable property interest for purposes
of Takings Clause).
116
OT A, supra note 18, at 63.
117
See R.L. Berkelman et al., Infectious Disease Surveillance: A Crumbling Foundation, 264
SCIENCE 368 (1994); David P. Fidler, Legal issues Associated with Antimicrobial Drug Resistance, 4
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES (1998), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol4no2/
fidler.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
114
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posed. This was a dodge, for calibrating these measures is extremely difficult.
Thinking about the optimal tax rate illustrates the problem. In order to
mimic the efficient price path over time for an exhaustible resource, the tax
on an antibiotic must rise over time at the rate of interest. As discussed earlier, such price increases are necessary to eliminate incentives to either sell
all of the resource immediately (if the price increases at a rate lower than
prevailing interest rates), or to withhold the resource indefinitely (if the
price increases exceed prevailing interest rates). This alone is not unduly
complicated; all the taxing authority need do is select the proper interest
rate and raise the tax by that percent each period. What is difficult is determining the appropriate initial level of the tax. This depends critically on
both supply (the cost structure for making a given antibiotic) and demand.
Public officials do not have very good information about either, and obtaining even crude estimates could be quite expensive. An error in setting the
initial tax rate will result in suboptimal tax rates for the entire working life
of the antibiotic. Finally, note that because the supply and demand for each
antibiotic differs, often substantially, the state would need to select a different initial tax rate for each antibiotic.
Pharmaceutical firms likely have better information on costs of making
antibiotics, and on the structure of demand for each drug. It would not be to
their fmancial advantage, however, to provide the government with honest
estimates. There is another way, however, to draw on this knowledge: give
firms monopoly rights in antibiotics. This, of course, is already done, at
least for limited terms, via the patent system.
It should not be surprising that patents offer at least a partial solution to
the problem of excessive use of antibiotics. As discussed in the introduction, absence of property rights in effective doses of antibiotics is one way
to conceptualize this problem. A patent creates a legally-protected monopoly on the right to produce, and a legal monopoly is a very powerful property right-the power to exclude the world from selling the product. The
remainder of this section analyzes the benefits, and the costs, of using patents instead of taxation to curb overuse of antibiotics.
1. Traditional Benefits and Costs of Patents.-The usual justification
for rewarding inventors with monopoly rights, called patents, is "a practical
utilitarianism: reward the creator of a useful thing, and society will get
more useful things .. . this mode of thought . . . is the core of all patent systems."118 The patent system is thus part of a market economy; it harnesses
the inventiveness of self-interested individuals to share their discoveries

118

ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES & MATERIALS 2 (3d ed.

2002).
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with society by offering a reward in the form of a monopoly over the invention for some period oftime (today, typically twenty years). 119
It is important to emphasize that, in the context of antibiotics, we are
studying a second, distinct facet of a patent monopoly that is not relevant
for most other goods. The traditional purpose of the patent system, encouraging innovation, remains relevant for antibiotics, but we are focusing on
the fact that a patent monopoly creates property rights that help mitigate
overuse.
For most products, the fact that the government grants a monopoly is
an evil for the usual reason: monopoly sellers restrain supply below the optimal level, raising prices above marginal cost, in a manner that maximizes
their private profits at the expense of social loss (the so-called "deadweight
loss" attributable to monopoly). 120 Patent monopolies, however, are necessary evils, since they provide the incentive to invest in innovation.
For antibiotics, it is not clear that monopolization is less desirable than
a free market, which suffers from the negative externality caused by a lack
of property rights. Because of this externality, prices above marginal cost
are desirable: these higher prices will constrain demand by discouraging
low-value uses, and preserving doses for more serious cases. Note that it is
in the self-interest of the patent holder to serve this social end.
In addition to the interaction of a patent monopoly with the negative
externality, we must account for the effects of a monopoly in a market for
an exhaustible resource like antibiotics. If monopolization involved no
deadweight loss in such markets, patents would provide an ideal solution to
the problem of antibiotic overuse.
Unfortunately, as demonstrated in the following section, a monopolist
controlling an exhaustible resource, like a monopolist over a regular 'reproducible' good, raises prices too much, at least initially. Thus, there seems
no 'perfect' market structure to address overuse of antibiotics. A free market, which is usually efficient, prices antibiotics too low because of the external effect of present use on future usefulness. A monopoly for this
exhaustible resource has the same defect as all monopolies: mispricing that
leads to rnisallocation. 121
119
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). The Drug Price Competition & Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 gives patent holders partial compensation for patent time lost in the drug approval process. /d.
§ 156.
120
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 66--{;8 (1988). If the demand curve
is horizontal, and in rare other cases (for example, a good with constant elasticity of substitution), monopoly prices (and quantities) will equal the efficient, competitive outcome. !d. For antibiotics effective
against both some serious conditions and some minor irritants, the demand curve will have a downward
slope, reflecting, inter alia, the fact that people will pay more to treat more serious illnesses.
121
This excessive price, in addition to blocking some desirable transactions, may indirectly cause
overuse of the tests discussed in the previous section that identify infective agents and their drug resistances. Recall that antibiotics priced too cheaply (not reflecting the negative externality of low-value
use) led to underutilization of such tests. The test is economically desirable only if its cost is more than
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It is possible to imagine a market structure that would price antibiotics
efficiently. The idea is to determine the optimal number of doses in each
period (say, 100,000), and grant licenses giving each of a large number of
competing firms (say 1000) the right to produce a small fraction of the total
(here, 100,000/1000, or 100). Selling the drug without such a license would
be illegal. Since no firm would have significant market power, none would
withhold supply; thus, together the firms would sell all licensed doses-by
assumption the efficient outcome. The following table summarizes how
this licensing regime relates to a free market and a monopoly market by
separating out monopoly from property rights.

Monopoly

Competition

Property Rights in
Antibiotics
Patent world; likely that
antibiotics underproduced

Licensing regime (large
number of firms, each
with license to service
small portion of market);
efficient outcome
TABLE2

No Property Rights in
Antibiotics
Natural monopoly, barriers
to entry, or some other force
creating monopoly; underproduction, as in case of patent monopoly (this regime
not discussed in text)
Competitive market; anyone
can produce antibiotics, they
are sold at marginal cost, and
thus are over-produced

In order to avoid the deadweight loss associated with patent monopolies, there have been recurring calls for a "reward" or "bounty" system, under which the government, instead of granting inventors a patent monopoly,
would make a one-time cash payment (reward), place the new invention in
the public domain, and presumably competition would insure that it sold at
marginal cost. 122 Such a system would be undesirable for antibiotics, however, because of the central problem studied in this Article: marginal cost
outweighed by the private benefit of using the test: finding out drugs will not work and saving the cost
of the drug. The cheaper the drug, the less desirable the test is. Monopoly, with an artificially high
price, presents the flip side of this scenario. Faced with this steep price for a treatment that may not
work, consumers will use the test in cases where the cost of the test exceeds its social benefits because
the artificially high price of the drug does not reflect its true social costs.
122
Robert C . Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward A/locative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug
Industry, 73 MILBANK Q. 213 (1995); Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging
Innovation, I 13 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998); Douglas G. Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government
Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, II HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (I 997); Steven
Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525
(2001). For a detailed analysis of these and other proposals, see Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003).
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pricing of antibiotics leads to excessive use. Prices in excess of cost,
though perhaps not as high as monopoly prices, are positively desirable.
There is one set of circumstances under which monopolists will price
efficiently: when they have the ability to price discriminate perfectly. Such
a price discriminating seller has detailed information on the demand of each
customer, and thus charges each the maximal price that they are willing to
pay. Each customer, then, pays a different price, hence the label "discrimination." This requires monopoly power, of course, for if there is competition, any attempt to charge higher prices to those with more intense desire
for the good would simply drive those customers to other sellers who stand
ready to undercut any price above cost.
A price-discriminating monopolist can capture all possible gains from
trade with her customers, and thus when she maximizes her private gain she
is also maximizing social gain. In the market for antibiotics, this means that
a price discriminating seller would never have the incentive to sell doses to
low-value users (at a low price) because such sales would later cost her
sales at a high price. This solves the basic negative externality of the antibiotic market. The ability to price discriminate means that, unlike a "regular" monopolist who must charge one price to all comers, such sellers have
no need to restrict supply and charge everyone a high price; they can "creep
down the demand curve" to capture efficient sales without undermining
their profits from sales to those willing to pay the highest prices.
Perfect price discrimination in practice is impossible; what seller has
enough information to size up individual buyers and accurately gauge the
highest price each is willing to pay? The welfare implications of imperfect
price discrimination are ambiguous. When monopolists are only able to divide up buyers into a few large groups and charge different prices to each
group, the outcome may be superior to a one-price monopoly, but also may
be worse. 123 Similarly, when monopolists try to separate ("screen") consumers with a menu of bundles with different prices, the result may be better or worse than the outcome under simple monopoly.124
Drug makers may be able to engage in fairly fine-tuned price discrimination. The holder of a patent for an antibiotic that is the ·sole treatment for
some class of serious infections (e.g., vancomycin, discussed in Part II) can
charge a higher price for that drug than for an agent mainly used to treat
minor illnesses. Patent holders may even be able to engage in price discrimination in the sales of a single substance. The owner of a drug effective
against both serious infection A and mild infection Z could market the drug
under two trade names, with an expensive version authorized for use
against A and a cheaper version authorized for use against Z.
Admittedly, price discrimination in markets for medical treatments has
been politically controversial. This issue has proved a hot button in the
123
124

TlROLE,supranote 120, at 139.
!d. at 149 ("The welfare analysis of nonlinear tariffs is ambiguous.").
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context of a very similar product, vaccinations. For example, it may well
be economically sensible (efficient) for a patent holder to charge lower
prices in less wealthy nations. Yet at a congressional hearing, "Senator
Paula Hawkins asked a major vaccine manufacturer how it could justify
charging nearly three times as much to the United States government for
vaccines as to foreign countries .... " 125 Similarly, President Clinton, with a
rhetorical flourish, said "I cannot believe that anyone seriously believes that
America should manufacture vaccines for the world, sell them cheaper in
foreign countries, and immunize fewer kids as a percentage of the population than any nation in this hemisphere but Bolivia and Haiti." 126
In response to this adverse publicity, U.S. manufacturers stopped submitting bids to supply vaccines to developing nations. 127 Curtailing this
form of price discrimination might well have been inefficient; as long as the
vaccine makers were able to charge at least marginal cost to poorer nations,
and those nations presumably found such a price attractive, the pressure to
charge one price to all comers destroyed some gains from trade. This experience indicates that political considerations may render infeasible economically desirable (i.e., efficient) policies like price discrimination.
Pragmatic policymakers need to realize the additional constraints imposed
by public opinion that, for whatever reason, do not square with economic
logic.

2.

Effect of Monopolies and Limits on Their Terms in Exhaustible
Resource Markets.-lf antibiotic patent holders cannot engage in
effective price discrimination, and instead must select one price, we know
that they will generally price above the competitive level in the exercise of
their market power. This model of monopoly behavior continues to apply
over time in the dynamic context of the exhaustible resource model. 128
To understand profit-maximizing strategy for monopoly owners of exhaustible resources, recall the discussion of competitive markets 129 in a
world of zero marginal costs. Under competition, the market moved up the
demand curve so that, per Hotelling's Rule, quantity decreased each period
so that prices could increase at the rate of interest. Any sharper price rise
cannot be an equilibrium because it would induce sellers to refrain from
selling; any lower price rise conversely cannot be an equilibrium because it
would induce all sellers to dump the good immediately.

125

Michael Kremer, Public Policies to Stimulate Development of Vaccines and Drugs for Neglected Diseases 24--25 (unpublished manuscript), available at http ://www.whoindia.org/EIP/CMHReport/CMH%20Papers/02_07.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
126
/d. at 25 n .9 (citing MITCHELLS. VIOLAINE ET AL.., THE CHILDREN ' S VACCINE INITIATIVE:
ACHIEVING THE VISION ( 1993)).
127 /d.
128
129

The following discussion is based on JON M. CONRAD, RESOURCE ECONOMICS 86-88 (1999).
Supra Part IV. B . I & fig.3.
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In that competitive market, there were, as usual, no economic profits.
A monopolist can do better. Under the simplifying assumption of zero
costs, a monopolist will want to maximize discounted revenue over time. If
the proceeds from the sale of a small amount of the resource (technically,
marginal revenue) in one period exceed the discounted value of the proceeds that could be obtained by waiting to sell the same unit in the following period, the monopolist would sell her entire stock at present; holding
even one unit would be inferior to selling the unit and investing the proceeds at the rate of interest. Conversely, if the marginal revenue in the next
period exceeded the current marginal revenue by more than the rate of interest, the monopolist would have no incentive to sell any units today.
Thus, by an argument similar in structure to that for competitive markets,
we reach a similar but not identical conclusion. Instead of moving up the
demand curve so that prices increase at the rate of interest, a monopolist
chooses quantities so that her marginal revenue rises at the rate of interest.
In other words, she moves up her marginal revenue curve instead of the
demand curve. 130 The following picture, then, illustrates the usual state of
affairs, when the marginal revenue curve lies below the demand curve.
price

10
6

4

quantity

Except in unusual circumstances (e.g., when the industry demand
curve is horizontal), this means that prices for an exhaustible resource under monopoly will rise less rapidly than in a competitive market. The key
130
Empirically, it can be difficult to calculate what portion of an exhaustible resource monopolist's
price reflects market power, as opposed to rent on the resource. See, e.g., Gregory M. Ellis & Robert
Halvorsen, Estimation of Market Power in a Nonrenewable Resource Industry, 110 J. POL. ECON. 883
(2002) (finding prices above marginal cost in nickel industry stem from monopoly power, not implied
rent due to owners of nickel deposits).
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to understanding this result is to note that the marginal revenue curve, except in the aforementioned unusual circumstances, lies below the demand
curve and has a steeper slope. Whenever a monopolist decides to sell one
more unit, the demand curve dictates the price, which is average revenue
(revenue per unit sold). Thus revenue on this marginal (one more additional) unit equals the new, lower price, as we move down the demand
curve a bit. The drop in price, however, means that there is a negative effect on revenue: the price received for all the units except this last (marginal unit) falls. This latter negative effect makes marginal revenue decline
faster than prices taken from the demand curve.
Consider, as indicated in Figure 4 supra, an initial price of 10, paired
with some quantity sold of q~, and assume the interest rate is 50%. 131 In a
competitive market, Hotelling's Rule dictates that the price must rise by this
50%, from 10% to 15%, in the second period. This translates into only q3
units transacted. Under a monopoly, however, the marginal revenue when
q 1 units are sold is only 4. It is this quantity, not price, that increases at the
interest rate (50%). Thus, the second period sales under monopoly decrease
only to q2, where marginal revenue is 6 and the price (jumping up the demand curve) is definitely Jess than 15. This same story repeats itself at each
step; moving up the marginal revenue curve leads to gentler price increases
than under competition.
There is one more step in comparing the two market structures. If a
competitive market will exhaust some stock of an exhaustible resource by
starting at some price Pc and reaching the choke price (a price high enough
to drive demand to zero) in some time period tc, a monopolized market cannot start at this same price, Pc· Since prices increase more slowly under
monopoly, such a price path would induce greater quantities transacted in
each period, and thus would exhaust the resource before the price reached
the choke price. Such a path, however, cannot be optimal for a monopolist,
since she could have raised her initial price (and thus, under Hotelling's
Rule, all subsequent prices) by some amount and enjoyed greater profits by
finishing at the highest possible price, the choke price.
This demonstrates that a monopolist in an exhaustible resource market
will charge a higher initial price than would prevail in a competitive market.
From this higher initial price, we can draw a further, perhaps surprising
conclusion: a monopolist will take longer to sell off the exhaustible resource than would a competitive market. If this were not the case, i.e., if
the monopolist exhausted the resource in a shorter time (or the same time),
we immediately reach a contradiction. We know that the competitive price
path will exhaust the resource. Starting at a higher price and finishing earlier (or at the same time) means that the quantity sold under monopoly must
be lower than under competition (with equality in the last period). But then
131

I have used such a high interest rate to illustrate starkly the difference between the demand curve
and the marginal revenue curve; the result does not depend on this choice.
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the total quantity sold under monopoly will be less than under competition-i.e., such a price path will not exhaust the resource. This cannot be
an equilibrium because the monopolist could earn more by selling the leftover resources in some or all periods. To sum up, a monopolist will charge
an initial price higher than the market, increase prices less rapidly, and these
together imply that a monopolist will prolong the time over which the resource gets used.
Monopoly is only the first half of the story. Because patents do not
grant monopoly rights forever, their limited term may affect owners' behavior. The holder of a patent for a normal, non-exhaustible resource maximizes profits by producing at the same output during each period. This is
not generally true for the holder of a patent on an exhaustible resource. If
the patent term is longer than the period over which a monopolist facing no
time constraints would exhaust the resource, the monopolist will simply follow her most-preferred plan; in this case, the patent's time limit isn't a
binding constraint. 132
If, however, the patent term is shorter than the unconstrained exhaustion period, the limited term will affect the way in which the patent holder
behaves. Not surprisingly, the limited term works in the opposite direction
of monopoly power. We have seen that monopoly power causes the owner
of an exhaustible resource to raise initial prices and stretch consumption
over a longer period. A limited patent term, by destroying the possibility of
monopoly pricing after expiration, puts pressure on the monopolist to move
sales forward in time, forcing a reduction in the initial price charged.
In most cases, the Hotelling Rule for monopolists applies: the patent
holder's marginal revenue must rise at the interest rate. As long as the patent period is not "too short," a profit-maximizing, time-limited monopolist
will still exhaust the entire supply of the resource. In order to do so, she
must start at a price lower than she would if she faced no time constraint. If
the patent period is sufficiently short, a monopolist can earn a greater profit
by ignoring all intertemporal allocation issues and behaving like a monopolist in a normal (non-exhaustible resource) market, keeping price constant at
the profit-maximizing level.
The socially optimal patent term is indeterminate. We know that the
consumption pattern for an unconstrained monopoly begins below the optimal path, but stretches consumption out over a longer period. A patent
that places a binding time constraint will induce the monopolist to charge
lower prices in order to sell all units of the exhaustible resource within the
constrained period. If the patent period is long enough for the monopolist
to exhaust the resource, this same general result will hold: the constrained
monopolist will begin with prices higher than desirable and quantities
lower, but will eventually charge lower prices. It is possible, however, that
132
The discussion that follows is based on DANIEL LEONARD & NGO VAN LONG, OPTIMAL
CONTROL THEORY & STATIC OPTIMIZATION IN ECONOMICS 230--35 (1992).
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the patent period will be so short that the monopolist will choose to charge
the simple, fixed monopoly price and will not exhaust the resource in the
patent period.
The key indisputable economic fact here is that an exhaustible resource
monopolist without any time constraint will initially price the good higher
than optimal, and will stretch out the useful life of the resource. For antibiotics, this means that a monopolist will price out of the market some moderate-value consumers, such as a patient with a painful but not serious
bacterial infection. This is the cost of monopoly. The benefit is that the
patent holder will maintain the utility of the drug for a longer-than-optimal
time. If society is risk-averse, this is an attractive trade-off. Granting antibiotic inventors very long-term patents trades off some short-term moderate
pain in return for ensuring the ability to treat the most serious illnesses further into the future.
3. Reimposing Patents.-Relatively short patent terms have left virtually every important antibiotic in the public domain, and thus marketable
at the usually low cost of production. Now that we realize the advantages
of maintaining property rights in antibiotics for longer terms, a seemingly
radical policy may be in order: re-establishing patent rights in some key antibiotics that have gone off-patent. Just to reiterate the lessons of the previous subsection, a patent establishes very strong property rights in an
antibiotic, and the holder of those rights has private incentives to sell the
drug to only relatively high-value users. One obvious candidate is vancomycin, a critical antibiotic of last resort for some lethal infections, that went
off-patent decades ago.
Although eminently sensible as an economic policy, this proposal may
seem radical from a legal perspective. After all, the purpose of patents is to
encourage creative activity-the Constitution explicitly so states in the
Copyrights and Patents Clause. 133 That same clause declares that such
rights are "for limited Times .... " 134 It seems impossible to argue that reimposing patent monopolies will induce inventors to greater efforts. Once
something goes off-patent, is not it supposed to stay in the public domain
forever?
Although there is no law directly on point, the answer to that question
is probably "no." In the recent decision Eldred v. Ashcroft, 135 the Supreme
Court upheld congressional extension of existing copyrights. Although not
precisely the same as reinstituting patents, the Court's opinion strongly
suggests that Congress has very broad powers to enhance copyrights and
patents retroactively.

133
134
135

U.S.
!d.
537

CONST.

art. I,§ 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts .. .. ").

u.s. 186 (2003).
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In addition to the indirect support that Eldred provides, reinstituting
patent status uses a traditional means to achieve a classic government end:
privatizing property rights to solve a collective action problem created by
antibiotics in the public domain. The government has awarded property
rights for similar purposes time and again. The United States sold off most
of the land in America' s vast public domain based on the assumption that
private owners would put it to more productive use than the government.
The government establishes monopoly rights in bands of the electromagnetic spectra in order to prevent simultaneous use of frequencies that would
render broadcast radio and television, cell phones, and other devices unusable.
These examples, of course, are only analogies. It may seem that oncepatented products should be treated differently based on their origins as patents. Yet there seem to be no precedents or policies that require or counsel
that products based on expired patents be treated differently from property
with more mundane origins. Expired patents look much like expired government leases. The state as lessor grants time-limited rights in a portion of
the public domain, but at the end of the term the government takes back
possession and has unfettered rights to make the land a commons, fence it
off, or re-let it to another individual. Reletting is analogous to reestablishing patent rights.
How should the government go about recreating patent rights? One
possibility would be to simply grant a new patent to the original patent
holder. This, however, seems hard to justify distributionally. The original
patentee has already enjoyed the expected monopoly term. Granting them
another patent would seem to be a windfall. 136 Expired patents are in the
public domain, and so should be managed to benefit the public at large.
Their interest seems best served by auctioning the patent rights to the highest bidder. The desired term may not be the usual twenty years. Thus the
government might want to auction rights for longer periods. Alternatively,
the state could conduct more frequent periodic auctions (e.g., annually, or
even every five years), and decide at the end of each term whether or not to
extend patent rights again.
E. Patent Terms & Planning for Plagues

Our concern with the patent term for antibiotics stems from their exhaustibility. For most goods, the main issue surrounding the choice of a
patent term is to set it just high enough to encourage desired innovation.
Excessively short patent periods provide too little incentive for innovation;
excessively long patent periods impose a needlessly extended run of deadweight loss due to monopolization.

136

See generally Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108

YALE

L.J. 1489 (1999).
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In the market for antibiotics, the nature of demand, when coupled with
exhaustibility, supplies another reason for a longer patent period. The demand for antibiotics is greatest when mankind faces some new bacterial
plague. Such plagues, fortunately, seem to be rare events. Unfortunately,
their timing is unpredictable. Economically, we can model bacterial
plagues as random, sudden, short-lived explosions in demand for antibiotics. Plagues are low-probability, high-cost disasters, like house fires or
floods. As such, some sort of insurance scheme seems like the natural way
to address the threat. During good times (no plagues), we should pay premiums, in the form of refraining from the use of newer antibiotics for which
resistance is rare or has not yet materialized. Society can then 'cash in' this
insurance policy by using the reserved medication to eradicate the new and
deadly microbe. Note that this is almost exactly what the holder of an
unlimited or long-term patent does: charges higher prices in the short term,
and stretches out the useful life of the drug.
Alternatively, the government, by regulation, could place all newlydeveloped antibiotics in a "lock box," barring their use until this reserve
contains enough drugs to address the threat of a plague. Regulation putting
new antibiotics in such a lock-box, however, would wreak havoc on private
incentives to develop new antibiotics.
One of the problems is that if we were to get a new class or new type of antibiotic, then people would want to save it and would therefore be reluctant to use
it. One of the difficulties for the pharmaceutical industry is looking for something which ostensibly is not going to be used. 137

One solution to this problem would be to socialize the development of
antibiotics. The government could fund research and development, and
forbid manufacture of the drugs it discovers until public health experts decide that a plague exists.
The fact that governments generally have limited their funding to basic
research, leaving the development of medication to private pharmaceutical
enterprises, suggests that the state may be a relatively inefficient drug developer and marketer. Thus it is worth exploring ways in which private ordering can create incentives for drug makers to squirrel away novel
antibiotics to address the risk of a plague.
The property rights created by patents can provide such incentives.
The possibility of a plague, like any sudden explosion in demand, will
translate into much higher prices for patent holders that postpone sales of a
new antibiotic. It is this potential for reaping very large gains in the event of
a plague that may induce private actors to preserve antibiotic effectiveness,
squaring their private calculus with the public interest. There are, however,
at least two problems with this solution.
137

Lenski, supra note 51, at 150 (comments of J.V. Copeland, SmithKline Beecham Consumer
Healthcare (UK)).
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First, the limited term of patents may short-circuit private incentives to
postpone marketing a newly developed antibiotic. It is quite possible that
the odds of a plague within the patent period (twenty years, roughly) are
small, even if the odds of a plague over a longer term approach one hundred
percent, as seems likely. For example, assume that the odds of a bacterial
plague appearing in any year are 0.5% (i.e., one in 200), and that the absence of a plague in one year has no effect on the odds of a plague appearing in future years. Under this scenario, the chance that at least one plague
will appear within twenty years are only ten percent, but there is a forty-five
percent chance of such a plague over 120 years. 138
The low odds of a plague within the patent period might well drive a
drug patent holder to begin marketing it despite a societal interest in postponing use. This might seem counterintuitive: any prospective gains
twenty years or more in the future will be discounted significantly under
any realistic interest rate assumption and thus, make waiting for a plague
uneconomical.
This supposition, however, is not necessarily true. For example, if we
keep the assumption that the odds of a plagues are 0.5% per year, assume
that an antibiotic will work against only one such plague (such intense use
likely will foster resistance in bacteria), apply a 3% real rate of interest, and
assume that a plague raises demand for an antibiotic by a factor of 250, then
putting a new antibiotic in a lock-box and saving it until the next plague returns, on average, 7.75% more than immediately marketing the drug. 139
Even though the expected date of the next plague is very remote and thus
profits from sales at that date are discounted quite heavily, the extra revenue
that stems from the explosion in demand during a plague is more than
enough to outweigh near-term (and thus lightly discounted) sales in lowdemand conditions. In a nutshell, it is privately rational to shelve antibiotics under these circumstances and wait for a big payday.
The upshot of this example is that patents with very long terms may
induce their owners, acting in self-interest, to preserve the effectiveness of
antibiotics in anticipation of a plague. 140 One way to understand this result
is to note that the usual limited-term patents create only temporary property
rights; once a patent expires, the product immediately becomes a commons.
138

If the odds of a plague in a given year are 0.5%, then the odds of no plague are 99.5%. The
chance of avoiding a plague for N years is then (.995)N Since this probability and its converse, the odds
of experiencing at least one plague, must sum to I 00%, the odds of one or more plagues within the next
N years are simply I - (.995)N Using the numbers from the scenario given in the text, for twenty years
we have I- (.995i 0 = .095 (9.5%); for 120 years, I- (.995) 120 = .452 (45.2%).
139
Appendix A, infra, derives these results.
140
As a policy matter, infinite-term patents might well be optimal. The Constitution, however, only
empowers Congress to create patents "for limited Times." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. That said, the
Eldred ~ase, see discussion supra text accompanying notes 133-135, apparently permits Congress to
renew intellectual property rights without limit; if so, Congress can create patents of infinite term by periodic renewal.
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For goods without any externalities, this is desirable: price falls from an artificially high monopoly level to cost, increasing the number of transactions
and thus eliminating deadweight loss. For antibiotics, of course, this decline in price and increase in use is undesirable because of the now-familiar
negative externality of current low-value usage. An extremely long-term
patent preserves property rights in the antibiotic, and the holder of this
property right, free from competition over any horizon, can withhold an antibiotic until a period of extraordinary need (i.e., a plague). Strong property
rights can make even a very long delay in selling a drug-i.e., putting the
drug in a lock-box-attractive to self-interested patent holders.
The benefits of very long-term patents, however, do impose greater
deadweight losses. Although there is no apparent method by which to
weigh this cost against the property rights benefits of long-term patents for
antibiotics, there are strong heuristic grounds to believe that the benefits exceed the costs. First, precisely because bacteria develop resistance to them,
antibiotics in effect have a built-in finite useful life expectancy. This sets
an upper limit on the size ofthe deadweight loss from monopoly. Contrast
this with a patent on, e.g., filters for liquids (oil, water) used in a broad array of goods. Such filters may well be used for eternity, and thus society
would suffer unending losses due to monopolization.
Second, the monopoly power created by a patent over a single antibiotic may be quite limited. If the drug has effective competitors in the markets for all bacterial infections, it may confer little monopoly power.
Moreover, those cases where significant monopoly power exists, i.e., where
the drug is uniquely effective against a serious illness, are precisely the
cases in which usefulness is valued most highly.
Finally, risk aversion again weighs in favor of long-term patents. If
society is risk-averse, it will not mind paying a 'premium' (in the form of
longer-term monopolization) in order to 'insure' against disastrous plagues
by creating incentives for patent holders to put some antibiotics in a lockbox. The trade off, fewer treatments for less serious cases (that, in an ideal
world, are efficient to treat) in order to preserve usefulness for the most serious rash of cases, seems worthwhile.
Society can, in theory, reach the true optimal consumption path by imposing the appropriate Pigovian tax instead of awarding long-term patents
on antibiotics. This approach, however, will largely undermine the incentives to research and develop antibiotics. In addition, as discussed earlier,
setting the proper tax rate is extremely difficult. 141 To summarize that discussion, it requires that the government obtain detailed knowledge of costs
and the demand for an antibiotic in each market where it remains effective.
The patent approach, on the other hand, leaves pricing issues to a manufacturer that is closer to, and an expert in, the market for drugs.

141

See supra Part IV.D.
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This private ordering solution to planning for plagues via patents of
very long duration depends critically on not only a free market for the sale
of antibiotics today, but also on the confidence that such a market will exist
in the future, especially in the event of a plague. Can the government credibly commit to refrain from regulating prices in such dire circumstances,
when voters express outrage over the high prices being charged for lifesaving medication? If pharmaceutical companies believe that the government will cave to popular pressure and impose price restraints or other regulations limiting their ability to reap the rewards of high plague demand, they
will find shelving the antibiotic until a plague arises too risky. Instead, they
will market the drugs immediately. This result is not socially desirable.
This is an example of a general phenomenon, the so-called timeconsistency problem. Actors often wish to convince others that they will
follow a certain course of action in the future. A monetary authority may
wish to convince private actors that it will not inflate the currency. 142 A taxing authority contemplating an 'amnesty' (waiving penalties for those who
pay overdue taxes) will want to convince delinquent taxpayers that it is a
one-time deal that the authority will never offer again. 143 Yet as time goes
by, it may become attractive for the monetary and taxing authorities to deviate from their pre-announced commitments. If private actors foresee this,
they will put little credence in the announced policies. Firms will expect inflation and factor that into their pricing and other decisions; taxpayers will
figure that later amnesty offers will materialize and so be less inclined to
pay their taxes.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that drug makers might lend little credence to a naked promise from the government to refrain from regulating
drug prices when plagues strike. For example, in the face of the spread of
anthrax via the mail in the fall of 2001, the makers of ciprofloxacin, the antibiotic of choice to cure such infections, were under intense scrutiny. It
appears that, contrary to economic logic, they decided not to raise the price
of the drug despite an increase in production that likely raised their marginal costs. 144 Similarly, the makers of AIDS medications face ongoing
pressure to reduce the price of their products. 145 How can the government
credibly commit to resist widespread calls to place ceilings on the prices of
key antibiotics if and when plagues strike?
The government could try to commit itself by contract, promising to
pay a pre-determined, relatively high price for an antibiotic in return for the
142
Fynn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of
Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1977).
143
AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE
EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 147 (1991).
144
Bayer Cuts Price of Anthrax Drug, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (Oct. 24, 2001), at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/anthrax/story/O, 1520,580129,00.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
145
Sarah Bosely, Glaxo Cuts AIDS Drug Prices in Africa, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (Sept. 6, 2002),
at http://www .guardian.co. uk/aids/story/0, 7369,78692 7,OO.html.

657
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 657 2004-2005

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

patent holder's agreement to keep the drug off the market until needed to
treat a plague. It is not clear, however, if the government can bind itself
convincingly under contract law. The general rule is that the government
can take actions as a sovereign that may undermine the value of a contract
to a party with whom the government previously contracted. 146 In Horwitz,
the Supreme Court refused to award contract damages to a party whose contract to purchase silk from the United States was erased by a general embargo.
It has long been held by the Court of Claims that the United States when sued
as a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of
the particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as a sovereign ... . Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cis. 383, 384 .. . In the Jones Case . ..
the court said: "The two characters which the government possesses as a contractor and as a sovereign cannot be thus fused; nor can the United States while
sued in the one character be made liable in damages for their acts done in the
other. Whatever acts the government may do, be they legislative or executive,
so long as they be public and general, cannot be deemed specially to alter,
modify, obstruct or violate the particular contracts into which it enters with
private persons . . . . In this court the United States appear simply as contractors; and they are to be held liable only within the same limits that any other
defendant would be in any other court. Though their sovereign acts performed
for the general good may work injury to some private contractors, such parties
gain nothing by having the United States as their defendants." 147

Thus, patent holders might fear that the government could characterize
its attempt to regulate antibiotic prices in general as a sovereign act which
does not constitute a breach of contract. The courts do not always buy such
arguments, 148 but patent holders might find the litigation risk of this issue
too great.
Another candidate mechanism for the government credibly to commit
itself to refraining from price regulation is the just compensation requirement. There is no question that a patent is a property interest protected by
Takings Clause. 149 Existing doctrine, however, suggests that price regulation is only a taking if unreasonable. Specifically, courts have rejected
landlord just compensation claims for residential rent control statutes as
long as the statute provides them with a "reasonable" or "fair" rate of return.150 What amounts to a reasonable rate of return is of course debatable,
146
147
148
149
150

Horwitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925).
/d. at461.
See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
See, e.g., Cromwell Assocs. v. Newark, 511 A.2d 1273, 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985)
("When the maximum increase allowable by the rent-control ordinance is insufficient to provide an efficient operator a fair rate of return, the ordinance is unconstitutional .... "); see also Searle v. City of
Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd., 271 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Ct. App. 1990) (invalidating ordinance limiting rent
increases to forty percent of inflation). For an enlightening discussion of the economic evidence that
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and drug makers might again decide that it is too risky to bank on the size
of just compensation awards to make them whole in the face of price regulation.
F. And When They're Gone ...

Even with very long patent terms that create strong property rights in
antibiotics, and with some policy to insure patent holders can reap large
gains when plagues strike, the premise that antibiotics are an exhaustible resource means eventually they will be gone. What measures could society
take in a post-antibiotic world?
As antibiotic prices became prohibitively expensive, we could expect
to see a range of responses. First, increasingly severe conditions would no
longer merit the use of antibiotics. The first uses priced out of the market
would be infections causing minor discomfort but without any threat of
permanent disability or death. As antibiotics become increasingly scarce,
bacterial infections causing significant pain and even disability would not
merit the use of antibiotics.
The government might consider approving the use of antibiotic agents
previously rejected for toxicity or non-trivial side effects. A drug that
causes severe nausea suddenly becomes attractive when the alternative is
serious illness. 151 Still, bacteria will develop resistance to such substances
as well, and thus this approach is merely a stop-gap. As a world without
any antibiotics approaches, people probably would seek out more vaccinations, conferring long-term protection against more serious bacterial infections. The returns to better hygiene would increase, and we might expect to
see greater investments in cleanliness, both on the part of consumers and
producers (e.g., restaurant and grocery employees).
If these measures did not work, at some future date (the time frame
admittedly is impossible to specify with any precision) people might limit
their social interactions. Those most susceptible to sickness, especially the
young and old, might risk exposure to others only when necessary. Alternatively, the vulnerable, and perhaps everyone, might wear protective gear
in public. Masks covering the mouth and nose, along with gloves might be
the first steps; if infectious threats become serious enough, people might
don full biohazard suits, breathing only highly filtered air, drinking only
highly filtered water, and never permitting any part of their skin to interact
seems to demonstrate that rent control might be unreasonable even in the face of deferential review, see
Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 741-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., in separate majority opinion).
151
In a slightly different vein, the FDA might want to rethink policy on substances so old that they
are off-patent, but that have never been approved by the agency. For example, fusidic acid, an old, offpatent drug, is effective against some strains of MRSA. The FDA, however, has never approved the
drug, and no firm is willing to cover the cost of sheparding the drug through the approval process when
it has no patent monopoly to guarantee a return. Other firms would simply free-ride on the efforts of
those paying for obtaining approval.
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directly with the external world. Admittedly such measures, in terms of inconvenience and other psychic disutility, are very costly, but in a world
teeming with untreatable infectious agents, people might be willing to make
such sacrifices.

G. Are Antibiotics Really an Exhaustible Resource?
Perhaps, however, the premise of this Article is excessively pessimistic. Although it seems true that individual antibiotics are exhaustible due to
the evolution of resistance, the larger question is whether antibiotics as a
class of drugs are exhaustible. This is as much an economic as a technical
question; the key factor is the evolution of the cost of discovering novel antibacterial agents. Even if there is an unending collection of discoverable
drugs, if the cost of developing successive generations of them rises extremely rapidly, then economically (if not technically), the supply of antibiotics is exhaustible.
There are some grounds to think that the cost of developing new antibiotics will rise. Scientists likely have "picked the low-hanging" fruit over
the last sixty-odd years, scouring nature and finding most of the antibiotics
developed naturally by molds, fungi, and other life forms that have battled
bacteria for eons. There may be few such rich veins left to mine.
On the other hand, the explosion in biological knowledge and techniques (e.g., decoding bacterial DNA and determining the purpose of each
gene) may reduce the cost of identifying new antibiotics. 152 Under the best
scenario, the gains from such technical processes would swamp the difficulty of finding non-natural agents. In this case, antibiotics would not be
exhaustible at all; they would be like any reproducible good. Pharmaceutical companies could discover them at a predictable, decreasing cost. There
would be no externality from any use; pricing at marginal cost would be efficient. Government intervention would be unnecessary.
One team of economists seems to think that, if properly regulated, antibiotics are more akin to a renewable fishery than an exhaustible mineral
supply. 153 They build a model on the premise that antibiotics can "regenerate" their usefulness if not used too intensively.
[T]he resource of resistance is much more similar to a renewable resource, in
that it has the capacity to regenerate itself .. . so long as there is a more general population of pathogens from which to draw, the reduction of the antibiotic application will afford the capacity for the pathogen population to evolve
in a less directed fashion . . . . In this way, the resistant stock of a particular

152
See, e.g., David Hughes, Exploiting Genomics, Genetics and Chemistry to Combat Antibiotic
Resistance, 4 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 432 (2003).
153
Timo Goeschl & Timothy Swanson, Lost Horizons: The Interaction of IPR Systems and Resistance Management (Draft Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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treatment may be considered as a renewable rather than an exhaustible resource.154
Their key assumption is that "there is a not insignificant fitness cost to carrying a trait that is not currently being selected for" 155-i.e., resistant strains
are at a fitness disadvantage to their susceptible kin when there is no antibiotic in the environment. If so, then "[i]f the treatment is withdrawn before
the pathogen population is wholly virulent [resistant], then the level of virulence [resistance] will again decline toward zero .... " 156 Based on their assumptions, and given a sufficient number of antibiotics, they construct an
equilibrium in which the pressure for resistance can be counteracted by
withdrawing each antibiotic after some period of use and waiting for its effectiveness to "recharge" as bacteria not exposed to it lose their resistance
because of the costs imposed by maintaining such resistance.
The problem with this model is that its fundamental premise, that bacteria will lose resistance if an antibiotic disappears from their environment,
does not appear to hold. As discussed at length earlier, 157 recent microbiological research strongly suggests that (i) the costs of maintaining resistance are often small to begin with, and (ii) resistant bacteria frequently
experience further evolution that eliminates these costs entirely. In addition, resistance dissipates much more slowly than it spreads, as the costs of
resistance in the absence of antibiotics apparently are much less than the
benefits of resistance in the presence of antibiotics. 158
Thus it appears that the only way to "escape" from the exhaustibility of
antibiotics is to invent new ones continually. From a macroeconomic perspective, the relevant question is whether the costs of this development increase at a rate noticeably higher than the growth rate of the economy as a
whole. If so, then in a real sense the cost of developing new antibiotics will
become more burdensome and in effect they would be an exhaustible resource. If the costs of discovering a new antibiotic requires, e.g., half of
GNP, the drug is effectively undiscoverable. It is like gold observed on
Mars by a telescope. Conversely, if national income grows more rapidly
than the cost of developing antibiotics, the burden of cranking out new ones
will continuously lighten.
Goeschl and Swanson have expressed optimism on this score. "There
is a virtually limitless number of methods for interfering in the basic processes of pathogen regeneration." 159 Oddly, these economists state this technical assertion without a word about cost. According to a group of
biologists, even without considering cost, this technical assertion is ques154
155

156
157
158
159

!d. at I.
/d. at 2.
/d.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
Bonhoeffer et al., supra note 92, at 12,1 07; 12, II 0.
Goeschl & Swanson, supra note 153, at 5.
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tionable. "[T]here is more to be done than merely generating new antibiotics-the pace of which cannot keep up with microbial resistance responses."160 If technical progress is no match for bacterial evolution,
antibiotics indeed are an exhaustible resource.
Technical progress may someday outstrip the ability of bacteria to develop resistance, but any such happy era lies somewhere in the future. At
present, many microbiologists seem to think that we face some non-trivial
span of time over which the number of antibiotics will decrease rather than
increase. Thus, even if the long-run prognosis is rosy, it seems that at present we face a period of years over which antibiotics are effectively exhaustible. For this time span, then, it is sensible for public policy purposes
to treat them as a depletable resource, so that we don't exhaust our supply
of antibiotics before technology eventually comes to the rescue. Failing to
take such a precaution may leave us exposed to the threat of an untreatable
plague.
H. The "Pure Time" Effect

So far this Article has assumed that the only process by which antibiotics lose their efficacy is use, i.e., that there is a fixed number of effective
doses and no more, but also no less. Tisdell's overlooked article contains
another possible effect ignored in subsequent scholarship: it might be that
antibiotics become less useful by the mere passage of time. 161 This section
demonstrates that if this "pure time" effect is significant, private ordering is
much less likely to work and the government would need to regulate antibiotic use heavily.
Tisdell finds that "[i]t is difficult to imagine relevant processes that are
solely quantity-dependent or solely time-dependent . . . . In practice, the
quantity of exposures to a new control technique and their time-pattern need
to be simultaneously considered." 162 The microbiology scholarship discussed in Part III suggests that Tisdell was on to something. Recall the frequency with which bacteria swap snippets of genetic material (plasmids).
Once a bacteria has developed resistance, then, it can pass this characteristic
on to other bacteria even if the antibiotic is not in use. It is quite possible
that a single plasmid encodes resistance to multiple antibiotics, say two: A
and B. Then administering antibiotic A will create an environment favoring
transfer of immunity to both antibiotics, even though nobody is receiving
doses of antibiotic B.
Thus it seems reasonable to assume that both the number of doses and
the passage of time play a role in determining the effectiveness of antibiotics. Indeed, other factors likely matter as well, e.g., the geographic spread
16° Carlos F. Amabile-Cuevas et al., Antibiotic Resistance, 83 AM. SCIENTIST 320, 320 ( 1995).
161 Tisdell, supra note 77, at 430.
162 !d.
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of use. Resistance to an antibiotic used in many cities with frequent travelers likely develops more rapidly than if the same number of doses are used
intensively in only one relatively isolated city. For expository clarity, however, we first will consider examples that focus on the "pure passage of
time," and ignore all other factors. We will then consider a simple example
combining the time effect with the dosage effect.
Consider an antibiotic that remains useful for, say, five years, regardless of the number of doses administered. The optimal use pattern is obvious: start using it immediately and price the drug at marginal cost. Any
delay reduces net social benefits with no offsetting gain. Thus, if antibiotic
resistance increases with time from first use, instead of doses delivered,
there is no externality from a lack of property rights: private ordering will
immediately produce the socially desirable outcome, high production (down
the demand curve all the way to marginal cost).
In his pure time model, Tisdell arbitrarily assumed that demand for an
antibiotic would increase over time. He gave no justification-and indeed,
made no such assumption in his dosage model. Unsurprisingly, given this
assumption he shows that if demand is increasing rapidly enough, it is efficient to delay use of the drug. 163 This approach is unfortunate, as it masks
the impact that a pure time effect has on the optimal policy: in the absence
of expanding demand, it strongly favors use sooner rather than later. Further, it makes pricing at marginal cost, the market outcome, socially optimal.
If there are multiple new antibiotics awaiting deployment, however,
private ordering is almost assuredly suboptimal if effectiveness declines
with the mere passage of time. A pair of examples contrasting a dosage
model with one combining dosage and time effects helps illustrate this
problem. Say that we have ten brand new antibiotics (label them A-J), and
that each is good for 100 doses. The socially optimal level of antibiotic
supply each period is 100 total doses, in any combination of the ten drugs.
In a world where only the number of doses matters for the development of
resistance, we could use the antibiotics in any pattern we wish, and still be
able to depend on 100 doses for ten periods. At one extreme, we could use
100 doses of A in period one, 100 doses of B in period two, and so on
through 100 doses of J in period ten. At the other extreme, we could use
ten doses of each antibiotic A-J in each period. In addition, we can use any
averaging ofthese two extreme cases (e.g., twenty doses of antibiotics A-E
in periods one to five; twenty doses of F-J in periods six to ten).
Now assume that, in addition to the effect from doses administered, the
number of effective doses of each of the ten antibiotics, once used, declines
with time according to the following formula: you lose ten doses to the
passage of time after one period, twenty doses after two periods, etc. The
following table summarizes the total number of doses of all ten antibiotics
163

!d. at 433-35.
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available if, in each period, we administer ten doses of each of the ten antibiotics (100 per period, as in the previous paragraph).
Period

0
1
2
3
4

Stock at
start of
period
1000
800
500
100

Loss due to
doses
administered
100
100
100
100

Loss due to
time passing

100
200
300
-

Stock remaining for next
period
1000
800
500
100
0

TABLE3

Under the combined influence of dosage and time effects, we will exhaust each of the ten antibiotics after four periods if we use all ten drugs
simultaneously.
If, instead, we use one drug per period, exhausting all I 00 doses before
any time effect kicks in, we can still supply the desired level of doses for
ten periods. Given that the pure passage of time detracts from the usefulness of the drugs, we want to use each in an intense burst; a pure time effect
makes "blitzkrieg" use of individual antibiotics desirable as opposed to the
simultaneous, modest use of all. Note that intense use of the drugs in seriatim fashion does not cost us anything if it turns out that only doses delivered matter. If, then, there is a reasonable possibility of a pure time effect,
this insight provides a robust reason for seriatim, intense use of each antibiotic in tum.
The market, unassisted, is unlikely to lead to this "burst" use pattern.
Even if all ten drugs have equal, level marginal cost, the optimal use is only
one of a continuum of equilibrium outcomes, and all other possibilities involve the suboptimal simultaneous use of more than one drug. Society
likely would need central coordination to deploy one drug at a time. If the
costs of making each drug rise with quantity produced, then it is very likely
that the market outcome involves the use of multiple drugs. Competitive
pressure will lead firms to produce each drug up to the point equating the
marginal costs of all in use. 164 The government would need to discourage
use of all but one antibiotic, either by regulatory fiat, by imposing a sufficient tax on all but one drug in each period, by using its power of eminent
164
If separate firms have new patents on each drug, the problem is worse. Each firm will want to
produce immediately for two reasons. First, the time value of money makes profits earned sooner more
valuable than profits earned later. Second, the limited term of the patents may make waiting even more
undesirable. The government will need to compensate patent holders to induce them to delay production, with cash and perhaps also with extensions of their patents' terms. This Article discussed the role
of patents in the antibiotic market at length. See supra Part IV.D.
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domain to force patent owners to sell their rights to drugs that the government wishes to shelve, or some other policy measure to ensure seriatim use
of antibiotics. Reductions in antibacterial efficacy due to the passage of
time, independent of doses administered, may be very important, then, in
determining the policy measures that will best preserve the potency of antibiotics.
/. Equity, Affordability, and Insurance
Whether addressing resistance driven by the mere passage of time or
by the number of doses administered, this Article so far has focused solely
on the most cost-effective means by which to preserve the potency of antibiotics. Such efficiency arguments are the mainstay of economics. Before
moving on to legal and political constraints on antibiotic policy in Part V,
this subsection offers some comments on the issues of equity and fairness
raised by the efficiency policies espoused in this Article.
Either Pigovian taxation or extended patent terms will raise the price of
antibiotics. This immediately raises an equity concern: what of those with
serious infections unable to pay these higher prices?
Following the conventional economic approach, this Article argues that
policymakers should address efficiency and equity separately. The efficiency discussions above weigh in favor of making prices reflect all costs,
including the external cost of current antibiotic use on future users. To deal
with any inequities created by these high prices, the government should use
taxation and income transfer measures. To nutshell an extensive literature,
the costs of undesirable transactions that result from mis-pricing antibiotics
are greater than the costs incident to taxing income and redistributing it to
the poor. 165
In practical terms, this means that the government should subsidize the
poor who need antibiotics, presumably under Medicaid. This is a form of
(social) insurance. As with any form of insurance, it may create incentives
for beneficiaries to behave suboptimally. In this case, of course, the worry
is that the poor will demand excessive antibiotics based on the lower subsidized price that they pay. This worry, however, may not pose a significant
threat. After all, private insurers face the same problems (insured drivers
have less incentive to drive carefully; insured businesses have less incentive
to install safety equipment) yet these markets operate effectively and on a
wide scale. Like private insurers, the government as a social insurer can
adopt measures to curb beneficiary misbehavior. In our case, requiring the
poor to pay for even a modest part of the price of antibiotics (a "copayment") will encourage them to forego use when their doctor has in165

For an introduction to this topic, see A . MITCHELL POLINKSY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW &
ECONOMICS ch. 2 ("Efficiency and Equity") & ch. 17 ("Efficiency and Equity Reconsidered") (3d ed.
2003). Summarizing, Polinsky states that "redistribution through the government's tax and transfer system may be cheaper and is likely to be more precise." !d. at 10.
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formed them that the infection is not serious and will clear up in a couple of
days.
·
Middle-class and wealthier consumers can hedge against high antibiotic prices via private insurance (usually through their employer). In addition to requiring the co-payments (as discussed in the previous paragraph,
for those insured by the government), private insurers might offer beneficiaries a range of coverages. Those desiring antibiotics for any infection
would pay relatively high premiums; others willing to forego antibiotics
when they suffer non-serious infections would pay much less. Through copayments, variable coverages and premiums, and similar mechanisms, the
price of antibiotics can affect the incentives of parties despite the fact that
their insurer is picking up part or all of the tab for antibiotics.
In theory, insurance (governmental or private) could work even in the
extreme case of a bacterial plague. As an analogy, note that existing health
insurance covers expensive procedures such as open-heart surgery by assessing affordable annual premiums to everyone and covering the costs of
the unlucky few who end up needing the procedure in a given year. The
same basic "spreading" principle applies to antibiotics. Instead of a dribble
of cases each year, however, plagues present a flood of cases every 100
years, say. To cover the very high cost of efficiently-priced antibiotics, insurers would need to accumulate sufficient reserves in years without
plagues to cover the huge expense of antibiotics warehoused for precisely
this contingency.
Such a private solution to high antibiotic prices during plagues could
obviate the need for any government involvement in pricing policy. It is
not clear, however, that insurers operate with this amount of foresight.
Similarly, consumers may lack such foresight; if so, they would be unwilling to pay for "plague coverage," and would flock to health insurers omitting such coverage and charging commensurately lower premiums. Finally,
it is possible that insurers would put pressure on the government to regulate
prices in the event of a plague. Although it might seem that such firms (via
management, employees, and shareholders) could not apply as much political pressure as the mass of potential plague victims, the insurance industry
looks like the kind of well-organized and well-funded "special interest
group" capable of exerting considerable influence in political circles.
Admittedly, the very wealthy may purchase antibiotics for minor infections. That said, all but the very wealthiest consumers are somewhat sensitive to prices. If the cost of a course of treatment with a key antibiotic like
vancomycin was $10,000, even someone making a million dollars a year
would think twice before paying 1% of her annual income (close to 1.5%
after taxes) to treat a trifling infection. It is important to note that the
wealthy frequently would also be able to evade command-and-control regulations on antibiotic use. They can travel to jurisdictions where enforcement is lax or non-existent, find doctors willing to falsely assert that the
patient has a serious infection, and obtain antibiotics through illegal chan-
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nels (witness the markets for illegal drugs). The bottom line is that there is
no perfect mechanism to curtail the use of antibiotics. We must compare
the cost of this "leakage" under the price system (very wealthy people using
antibiotics to treat trivial infections) to the costs and limited efficacy of
command-and-control regulations. 166
V. NATIONAL LEGAL & INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF
THE PROBLEM

Having described the economically efficient means of dealing with resistant bacteria and the distributional concerns raised by these policies, it
remains to discuss the legal and political context, and constraints on policymaking in the real world. The intensifying scarcity of antibiotics over the
coming years requires inter-jurisdictional solutions, as resistant bacteria
have no regard for state or national boundaries-resistant bacteria do not
politely wait for visas before crossing borders. If any states or nations continue to use all known antibiotics indiscriminately, its citizens will serve as
a breeding ground for resistant bacteria that, in today's highly connected
world, will soon spread around the globe. The following subsections examine this problem at two levels. The first considers the legal grounds for national regulation of antibiotics among the several states of America. The
second weighs the practical policy issues presented in trying to make sure
that poor as well as wealthy nations rationalize their consumption of antibiotics.
A. National Dimensions
To the extent the national government employs longer-term patents to
curb overuse of antibiotics, the Constitution's allocation ofthe patent power
exclusively to the national govemment 167 affirms the federal government's
power to act. Recent cases on state immunity from damage suits under the
Eleventh Amendment might prevent Congress from authorizing damage
suits against a state that decided to infringe an antibiotic patent, but the patent holder or the U.S. government could obtain an injunction ordering a
state to cease production and distribution not authorized by the patentee. 168
166

See supra Part IV.C.l.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have power to .. . promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries . .. .").
168
U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coli. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred
suits for monetary damages against states that infringe patents); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(subjecting state officials to injunctive orders of federal courts). Note, however, that the Supreme Court
in some cases has refused to entertain requests for injunctive relief against the states. Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
167
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If Congress decided instead to rely on regulation, the Commerce
Clause would seem to provide ample grounds to assert federal authority.
The negative externality of low-value antibiotic use presents precisely the
type of activity with cross-border, or spillover effects, for which the Constitution gives that federal government power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause.
One scholar seems to disagree:
Congress probably does not have the authority to regulate antimicrobial prescription practices directly; such authority rests with the states. The U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) has authority to restrict the post-approval
marketing of new drugs designed for treating serious or life-threatening illnesses and has indicated that these regulations can be used specifically in cases
of new antimicrobial drugs. Restricted distribution is, however, a disincentive
to the development of new drugs, and the regulations do not address misuse of
existing products. 169

On a careful read, however, Fidler asserts only that the federal government
might not be able to "regulate ... prescription practices directly .... " The
grounds for even this narrow restriction on national power, however, are
statutory, not constitutional. Although it is true that traditionally and at present the states have controlled most issues surrounding regulation of medical prescriptions, the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence
suggests that Congress has the power to take over this arena. 170
Fidler seems to have meant that under existing federal law-in the
main, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") 171 -the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA", created under the Act) has no authority to regulate
prescriptions in general. 172 The FDCA regulates safety, but not prescribing
power. Thus, as long as it is legal under state law, physicians can write prescriptions "off-label"-for uses not covered under the "label" information
approved by the FDA.

169

Fidler, supra note 117.
The seminal modern cases defining the federal government's broad powers under the Commerce
Clause are United States. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding power of Congress to regulate hours
and wages, even for employees of businesses with only an indirect impact on interstate commerce), and
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942) (upholding application of national wheat marketing quota to
farmer who consumed or sold locally his crop). Recent Supreme Court cases setting limits on the
Commerce Clause have barred national regulation in areas that are not commercial in any ordinary sense
of the word. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating federal statute making
gender-motivated violence a federal crime); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating
federal statute forbidding carrying firearms near schools). Antibiotic use nationwide is a classic example of interstate commerce, so Congress is almost surely unconstrained in its power to regulate the market for antibiotics.
171
21 U.S.C. §§ 30Hi95 (2000).
172
Markow, supra note 101, at 541-43.
170
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Other existing statutes might provide the basis for regulating the use of
antibiotics. The Federal Controlled Substances Act ("FCSA"), 173 though
designed to regulate addictive substances, does give the Attorney General
the power to regulate any substmce that poses a "risk to public health." 174
At present, unsurprisingly, no antibiotics appear on the list of controlled
substances, but the "risk to public health" standard sounds broad enough to
regulate antibiotics; profligate use today can cause deaths in future years,
the ultimate risk to public health.
Finally, if Congress decided to regulate via taxation (e.g., a Pigovian
tax), its power is almost plenary. In McCray v. United States, the Court upheld a very high federal tax on colored margarine even accepting that the
sole purpose of the tax was to give the butter industry a decisive competitive advantage. "Since ... the taxing power conferred by the Constitution
knows no limits except those expressly stated in that instrument, it must follow, if a tax be within the lawful power, the exertion of that power may not
be judicially restrained because of the results to arise from its exercise.'ms
If an anti-competitive tax favoring one industry over another does not violate the taxing power, it seems almost certain that Congress has the power
to impose an efficient tax designed to solve a collective action problemsuch as a Pigovian tax on antibiotics.
B. International Dimensions
As Fidler has observed, the problem is international: "An important
feature of the latest chapter in mankind's struggle with infectious diseases is
that the threat ... is global in scope." 176 The United States cannot go it
alone. To avoid squandering antibiotics requires all nations (each on its
own, or in unison) to adopt policies that will induce or coerce consumers to
refrain from excessive use. If any nation, especially one of significant size,
continues to use antibiotics indiscriminately, resistant strains will evolve
there. As noted in the introduction to this section, the extent of international travel and trade virtually guarantees that resistant strains will have
numerous opportunities to travel around the globe and threaten everyone.
The necessary cooperation does not seem like a significant problem for
developed nations. With well-educated populations that democratically select leaders, and sophisticated bureaucracies to provide expertise, it should
173

21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
Id. § 8ll(c)(6). Under the Act, the Attorney General places controlled substances on "schedules," numbered one to five, with greater restrictions on use the lower the schedule number. 21 C.F.R.
§ 1308.11 (class 1)-1308.15 (class V) (2004).
175
195 U.S. 27, 59 (1904). For a more recent discussion of the virtually unlimited taxation powers
of Congress, see United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953) ("It is axiomatic that the power of
Congress to tax is extensive and sometimes falls with crushing effect . . . . As is well known, the constitutional restraints on taxing are few.").
176
David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases & International
Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771,774 (1997).
174
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be theoretically possible (if one believes in democracy, anyway) for leaders
to line up public support behind policies that will economize on antibiotic
use and save lives down the road. An international accord to rationalize antibiotic use need not specify a single means of compliance; one nation
might choose a Pigovian tax specified in the agreement, another might prefer long-term patents. All that matters is that each nation limits key antibiotic usage to relatively serious cases.
Securing the cooperation of less developed nations, however, would
likely be more difficult. 177 If so, antibiotic use in these nations poses a significant threat to the effectiveness of the most valuable antibiotics. It will
be harder to sell a less educated citizenry on the short-term pains necessary
to achieve long-term gains in treating serious bacterial infections. And unpopular regimes might hold out cheap, easily-obtainable antibiotics as a
"goodie" compensating citizens in part for other policies its citizens find
objectionable.
Even a willing government in a poorer nation might not possess the bureaucratic machinery to implement a solution. These countries may lack the
police and judicial systems necessary to make patents effective. Similarly,
such nations have only rudimentary tax collection systems, and effectively
imposing a Pigovian tax might be beyond their capabilities. In addition,
any significant tax will create a black market for which (again) there is insufficient legal enforcement to control. These structural problems stand in
the way of numerous beneficial policy reforms in the developing world, and
they do not seem to be amenable to any easy solutions.
There are some economic problems with limiting antibiotic use in developing countries that may be tractable, however. The lack of health insurance will make it more difficult to assure the non-wealthy that they will
receive expensive treatments if and when they need them. Any attempt to
charge high prices in poorer economies will inevitably raise cries of unfairness, along with the concern that only the wealthy will ever receive treatment. Any notion that pharmaceutical giants from developed nations are
making profits from the working classes in poorer nations will only exacerbate the perceived inequity.
There are a couple of ways to address this perception of unfairness.
First, note that the price necessary to squelch inefficient low-value uses of
antibiotics will be much lower in poor countries. Thus, permitting or even
encouraging and assisting price discrimination, with significantly lower
prices charged in developing nations, would serve notions of fairness. It often will be in the financial interest of a patent holder to engage in such price

177

Although antibiotics are widely available over-the-counter in many third-world nations, it seems
likely that those most widely available are older ones for which there is already significant resistance.
See Investigating the Antibiotic Resistance Problem, at http://www.woodrow.org/teachers/bi/2000/Antibiotic_Resistance/introduction.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
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discrimination. 178 Wealthy countries also could address perceptions of injustice simply by donating (or selling at a deep discount) to poorer nations
their estimated efficient level of antibiotics each year. The poor nations
could then allocate the doses as they saw fit; for the purposes of the global
battle to preserve the effectiveness of antibiotics, all that matters is that
somehow governments limit the number of doses administered.
Summing over a number of antibiotics and a number of larger poor nations (e.g., India, Pakistan, Indonesia), the wealthy countries' pharmacy bill
for gifting (or discounting) all this medicine likely would be significant. Is
it worth it? One key point in answering this question is that such subsidies
may be the best way, and perhaps the only way, to obtain the cooperation of
poorer nations in the effort to control bacterial resistance and perhaps avoid
a plague. If so, then the entire enterprise depends on this piece of the puzzle.
Subsidies to such participants are rational when, as with antibiotic resistance, a single weak component can undermine the entire scheme. This
situation is called a "weakest link" technology; if a single program to limit
antibiotic use fails, the efforts of all other nations are futile. 179 In other
situations, e.g., sending a man to the moon as soon as possible, it makes
sense to go to the other extreme and concentrate all resources on a single
program. This is called "best shot" technology. For situations involving
weakest link technology, it can be rational for wealthier participants to subsidize the efforts of their poorer sisters. The wealthy might prefer a world
where every nation pays its fair share, but that may be impossible or
unlikely. Then the wealthier nations face a choice: subsidize and succeed,
or don't subsidize and fail. As long as the subsidy is smaller than the gains
from success, subsidy is preferable.
VI. CONCLUSION

Paying significant subsidies (in one form or another) to assist distant
nations may be a difficult sell for politicians in the United States and other
developed nations. Yet assistance that helps poorer nations rationalize their
use of antibiotics provides tangible domestic benefits: protection of the donating nations (as well as the donee nations) from the specter of untreatable
bacterial infections. Failure to control antibiotic use in poorer countries
178

See supra text accompanying notes 122-127. For an extended defense of price discrimination in
the international sale of patented drugs, see Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Differential Pricing
for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D, and Patents, 3 INT'L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON.
183 (2003).
179
The pioneering study of "weakest-link" and related public goods "technologies" is Jack
Hirschleifer, From Weakest-Link to Best-Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, 41 PUB.
CHOICE 3 71 (1983). The discussion in this paragraph also draws on Richard Comes, Dyke Maintenance
& Other Stories: Neglected Types of Public Goods, I 08 Q.J. ECON. 259 { 1993), and RICHARD CORNES
& TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, & CLUB GOODS 54-55, 184-89
(2d ed. 1996).
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will render futile all domestic policy measures adopted toward the same
ends.
As for the optimal domestic policy measures, this Article argues that
patents of extraordinary duration are an attractive option for creating property rights that solve the negative externality at the root of antibiotic overuse. In return for higher prices early in the life of the antibiotic (the
"premium"), society benefits from the monopoly patent holder's incentive
to stretch out the useful life of the drug ("insurance coverage"). Assuming
that society is risk-averse with respect to the possibility of depleting its arsenal of effective antibiotics, this trade-off is attractive. Note that making
the patent term extremely long creates less social loss for antibiotics than
for most inventions, since bacterial evolution of resistance effectively limits
the useful life of such drugs. Finally, long-term patents give private parties
a planning horizon that may induce them to keep new antibiotics in reserve,
in anticipation of the possibility of a bacterial plague.
In conjunction with long-term patents, the government should
(i) subsidize the cost of tests that determine the germ causing an infection
and its drug resistances; (ii) continue to subsidize vaccinations, and provide
additional subsidies for research to develop vaccines for serious bacterial
infections; and (iii) invest more in gathering information about infections
caused by resistant bacterial strains.
Without these or other measures (e.g., a Pigovian tax) to curb overuse,
society runs the real risk of a future in which some serious bacterial infections will be untreatable. Worse, if such infections spread easily, mankind
could suffer a disastrous plague. The problem poses a fundamental test of
democracy and leadership in wealthier nations. The root problem is one of
collective action: what is individually rational, to use antibiotics whenever
they might help even a little, is socially irrational. Governments exist in
large part to solve such problems. Arguments against taking action to curb
overuse of antibiotics reflect myopia ("I prefer cheap antibiotics (and meat)
today, even if it puts my children at risk of death from a resistant bacteria in
20 years") or false economy ("Why should we subsidize citizens in poorer
nations?"). Failure to act will reflect either deficient leaders unable to disabuse citizens of these misguided notions, or a dissolute populace unwilling
or unable to make modest sacrifices now to limit grave future risks.
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APPENDIX

Deriving Results Comparing Immediate Sale of a Novel Antibiotic
with Shelving It in Anticipation of the Next Plague
(discussed supra text accompanying footnotes 13 8-13 9 )
First, define the following terms:

r = real rate of interest

1
l+r

o=-p = odds ofplague in a given year
H = (high) price of drug during a plague (assume H = I without loss
ofgenerality)
L =(low) price of drug during normal times
Vw = Expected value of waiting to market until first plague
Vm =Expected value from marketing immediately
The usual manipulation of potentially infinite-term discounting equation tell us that V w is given by:

Vw= p[(l- p)t52]
1- (1- p)t5
Under the assumption that r = 3%, p = 0.5%, and L = H/250, Vw computes to .14 (i.e., 14% of the value of being able to sell the drug immediately in a plague (high-demand) market).
Computing Vm is a bit more involved. The following explanation demonstrates how to compute the expected value for a given year, and then presents computation results for a twenty-year period by summing up such
terms.
Given our assumption that an antibiotic can be used against only one
plague, for each year we must calculate the odds that a plague occurs first in
that year; this is given for year t by

The expected payoff in such a year (low demand in all preceding years,
then high plague demand in that year) is the sum of a discounted series of
t-1 payments of L followed by a discounted payment of H:
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8-8~ (L+8rH)
1-8
The expected payoff is then simply the sum of the product of these two
terms over the number of years-in our case; the length of the patent period, which is roughly twenty years. There is a final term, beyond the sum,
to reflect the possibility that no plague occurs within the twenty-year period; the expected value in that case simply includes the discounted value of
a stream of twenty payoffs in low-demand (non-plague) markets. Algebraically, we have:

The following table shows the calculation of this sum for the parameters used above r == 3%, p == .005, H == 1, L == 11250).
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Year

Odds that
first
plague
occurs m
this year

Discounted
value if 1st
plague occurs in this
year

Product of
odds and
discounted
value

1
2
3

0.50%
0.50%
0.50%

0.97
0.95
0.92

0.0049
0.0047
0.0046

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

0.49%
0.49%
0.49%
0.49%
0.48%
0.48%
0.48%
0.48%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.47%
0.46%
0.46%
0.46%
0.46%
0.45%

0.90
0.88
0.86
0.83
0.81
0.79
0.78
0.76
0.74
0.72
0.70
0.69
0.67
0.66
0.64
0.63
0.61

0.0044
0.0043
0.0042
0.0041
0.0039
0.0038
0.0037
0.0036
0.0035
0.0034
0.0033
0.0032
0.0031
0.0030
0.0029
0.0029
0.0028

90.46%

0.60

0.0538
0.1281

Comment
plague in 1st period
plague not in 1st, but in 2nd
plague not in 1st or 2nd, but
in 3rd

plague not in 1-19, but in
20th
no plague during 20 years
TOTAL EXPECTED
VALUE

The total expected value, about .129, is roughly seven percent less than
the expected value of simply waiting for the first plague before marketing,
no matter how long that might take. Thus, in a world without a time limit
on patent monopolies, it would be privately rational for a patent owner to
wait; this squares with the socially optimal result. Time-limited patents
shorten the horizons of the patent holder and may make it privately rational
(though socially undesirable) to market the antibiotic immediately.
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